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            The Spanish conquest of the Americas has created an ongoing debate among historians, politicians,
and activists.  Though the European discovery and conquest of the Americas altered the course of world
history, the Spanish conquest has created the biggest controversies.  Historian Lewis Hanke wrote that no
other European nation, at any time, debated the justice of their actions so strongly or persistently.[1]  The
debate grew from the Spanish priests in the New World and their concern for the Native Americans they
evangelized.  Bartolomé de Las Casas, a Dominican friar, led these concerned priests and devoted over half
of his life to defending the Native Americans.
            Las Casas’ writings and arguments caused an uproar among Spanish intellectuals.  Many Spaniards
tried to justify the conquistadors and their actions as well as the resulting encomienda system, which was
based on Indian slavery.  Many others, however, joined Las Casas.  Las Casas and his supporters had a major
impact on the New World, both on Spanish law and colonial practice.  Bartolomé de Las Casas’ works and
the clerical resistance to Spanish colonialism he led ultimately tempered the Spaniards’ – and other
Europeans’ – colonial practices.
Las Casas became increasingly concerned with the plight of Native Americans after arriving in the
Americas.  He crossed the Atlantic at the age of twenty-eight, coming to the Caribbean as a priest in 1502.[2] 
Later, in 1512, he took part in the conquest of Cuba.  While there he received an encomienda.[3]  However,
deeply troubled by the actions of the conquistadores and the encomenderos, he renounced his holdings in
1514 and committed himself to defending the Native Americans.  He then gave a series of sermons in the
Caribbean denouncing the conquistadores as sinful for their actions in the Caribbean.  He continued his
campaign for Native Americans, even after he returned to Spain later in his life.  During these last years of
his life, he kept up his work by debating leading Spanish intellectuals about the New World.
In addition to speaking against the Spaniards’ treatment of the Native Americans, Las Casas wrote
constantly, appealing to the King of Spain to change colonial practices.  His depictions of Spanish atrocities
in his histories clearly affected Spanish monarchs and intellectuals across Europe.  Las Casas related the
countless horrors that he and other priests witnessed in the Americas in his many works, the most notable of
which was the Brevísima Relación de la Destrucción de Las Indias, or The Brief Relation of the Destruction
of the Indies.  In this work, sent to the King of Spain in 1542 and later published throughout Europe, Las
Casas estimated that more than twelve million Native Americans had died at the hands of the Spaniards.[4] 
He also graphically told of the Spaniards’ atrocities.  In Nicaragua, for example, Las Casas wrote that more
than four thousand Spaniards killed an Indian every day.[5]  These claims and statistics led him to call the
Spanish conquest nothing short of a “holocaust.”[6]
Though his writings were very moving, Las Casas’ history was not exactly accurate.  The number of
people that he claimed were killed seems very high.  According to him, the Spaniards killed thirty thousand
Native Americans during a massacre at Cholula.[7]  As was mentioned above, he also claimed that the
Spaniards killed a total of twelve million Indians.  However, many historians have discounted these claims. 
According to Latin American historian Peter Bakewell, Las Casas overestimated Native American
populations.  At the time of discovery, Bakewell says that Native American population estimates have ranged
from 8.4 million to 112 million.[8]  Thus, Las Casas’ estimated death toll has exceeded some estimates of the
New World’s entire 1492 population.  Though the lower estimates may not be accurate, Las Casas’ numbers
still seem unrealistically high.  Bakewell even refers to some of the Dominican’s assertions as
“notorious.”[9] 
Las Casas exaggerated land areas as well.  He claimed that Trinidad was as large as Sicily and that
Trinidad was more fertile.[10]  However, a simple look at a world map shows that Trinidad is in fact only
about one-fifth of Sicily’s size.[11]  Las Casas continually made similar errors throughout his histories, both
in estimating populations and land area.  He did not make these exaggerations because he was trying to
deceive the Spanish.  He truly believed that twelve million people had died and that Trinidad was that large. 
Accurate or not, his numbers still related his images of death and destruction much more clearly than if he
had not included them.
Las Casas’ supporters and allies raised many similar concerns.  Fray Antonio de Montesinos, who
actually preceded Las Casas, first spoke against the Spanish conquistadores in 1511.  During a Christmas
sermon, he decried their practices in the New World, warning that they had jeopardized their salvation. 
Speaking with a great moral force, he proclaimed:
I have come up on this pulpit, I who am a voice of Christ crying in the wilderness of this island, and
therefore it behooves you to listen, not with careless attention, but will [sic] all your hearts and senses,
so that you may hear it; for this is going to be…the harshest and hardest and most awful and most
dangerous that ever you expected to hear….  [Y]ou are in mortal sin, that you live and die in it, for the
cruelty and tyranny you use in dealing with these innocent people.[12]
Montesinos made his message very clear, threatening the Spaniards with eternal punishment for their
excesses.  He also urged the Spaniards to give up their encomiendas to redress their sins, as Las Casas later
did.  In fact, Montesinos’ teachings, as well as Las Casas’ own Biblical studies, convinced him to give up his
lands in 1514.[13]
            Many Dominican friars also supported the crusade to save the Indians.  After Montesinos and Las
Casas spoke about the New World atrocities, other Dominicans in the New World followed them by refusing
absolution to any encomenderos who would not free the Indians in their charge.[14]  The Dominicans in
Spain helped Las Casas compile and publish both his writings and the documents he brought back to Spain. 
Still other Dominicans spread his message of restraint and evangelism throughout Spain’s American
possessions.
Las Casas’ works, even with the exaggerated numbers he put forth, did not convince many
Europeans.  Most still thought the Spanish conquests were neither wrong or excessive.  Juan Ginés de
Sepulvada, a humanist scholar and a leading proponent of Spanish colonialism, became Las Casas’ primary
intellectual adversary after 1550.[15]  The two conducted a series of debates over the justice of Spanish
claims to the New World and the morality of the conquest.  Sepulvada argued that the horrors of Native
American religions compelled the Spaniards to take action against the Indians.  As he said in a discussion of
the wars of conquest:
Greater evils than the death of the innocent followed from that war.  His Lordship (Las Casas) has the
figures all wrong.  In New Spain, we are told, by all those who return and took care to find out, that
twenty thousand persons a year were sacrificed….  [T]he war halted the loss of those countless souls
who save themselves by converting to the faith, now, or later on.[16]
Being a humanist, he also saw the Native Americans as barbaric.  In order to civilize the Native Americans,
Sepulvada thought, the Spaniards needed to conquer them.  As a result, Sepulvada claimed that the Native
Americans were slaves by nature and that the wars of conquest were therefore justified.[17]
            Other Spaniards disputed Las Casas’ ideas during the sixteenth century, often for political reasons. 
Humanist lawyer Vasco de Quiroga, a proponent of the encomiendas, was one such dissenter.  He advocated
encomiendas and quasi-utopian Indian communities, claiming that they were the most effective way to bring
the Native Americans out of their barbarism and under Spanish tutelage.[18]  Like Sepulvada, Quiroga
clearly believed that the Native Americans were barbarians and that the Spaniards had a duty to civilize them.
            The debate’s dynamics proved rather interesting.  Wolfgang Reinhard considered the opposing sides
in the sixteenth-century debates.  In his study, he argued that most humanists, like Sepulvada, believed that
Spanish colonialism was just.  These men, the leading scholars of the time, were usually not affiliated with
the Church.  Many defenders of the Indians, however, were members of the clergy.[19]  Reinhard notes the
irony that the humanists, considered the intellectual leaders of the Renaissance, embraced more traditional
thought in the debates.  They did so by supporting the Pope’s right to distribute lands in the New World and
the Spaniards’ right to savagely conquer these lands in the name of the Gospel.  Meanwhile, strangely
enough, the friars, who are supposedly the main supporters of the Church and traditional thought, vehemently
protested Spanish colonial policies.[20]
These debates did not simply disappear with the end of the sixteenth century or with the end of
Spanish colonialism in the New World, though.  Critics in later times have discounted Las Casas’ works,
mainly to discredit the points that he made.  Many historians have discounted his works to create a more
tempered view of the Spanish conquest.  Argentine historian Rómulo D. Carbia even accused Las Casas of
falsifying documents to prove his points; however, Carbia died before he could prove his accusations.[21] 
Even though no one has proven Las Casas actually did falsify his work, Carbia’s claims still remain.  Further,
other historians have been quick to note his bias.  Again, though his bias does not negate his ideas, it does
hurt his credibility as a literal historian.[22]
Las Casas, despite his inconsistencies, still has many defenders.  Some historians have said that he did
not intend to convey absolute accuracy as much as he wanted to help his readers visualize the destruction and
desolation that the Spaniards left in the wake of their New World conquests.  One historian in particular,
Ramón Iglesia, noted as much in his writings about Las Casas, remarking that the priest’s version of history
“is history written to prove something.”[23]  Clearly, if read with a sort of suspended disbelief, Las Casas
made the conquest of the Indies every bit the horrendous chapter in history that he wanted to convey to his
readers.
The emotion and power of Las Casas and his supporters’ works were definitely not lost on the
Spaniards.  In fact, a 1512 transcription of a Montesinos sermon created such an uproar in the Spanish court
that King Ferdinand commissioned six theologians to formulate an adequate reply to Montesinos’
accusations.  Las Casas’ work caused even greater uneasiness in the Spanish court.  Both his relation of
atrocities in the New World and Dominican arguments that the Indians were in fact reasonable human beings
led Charles V to pass many new laws in 1542.  In these laws, he included many provisions protecting Native
Americans.  Most notably, Charles outlawed Indian slavery and the encomienda in the Americas.  He passed
these laws because, according to him, “The preservation, the fostering of the Indians, has always been the
primary purpose of our policy and that they receive instruction in matters concerning our Catholic faith, and
that they be treated exactly as the free peoples they are, as our vassals.”[24]
Though the encomienda ban never took effect in the Americas (it was repealed shortly thereafter), the
spirit of the ban as well as the other provisions of the laws showed the effects that Las Casas and his
supporters had upon Charles V.  The arguments he heard were very convincing.  The brutal imagery and the
conclusions that the priests drew from them deeply concerned the King, and the laws he made for
administrating the New World show as much.[25]
Bartolomé de Las Casas and others who thought like him changed Spanish colonialism during the
sixteenth century.  As historian Lewis Hanke noted, the Dominicans made evangelization, the supposed
initial motive for the Spanish conquest of the New World, important.  They did so because the Spaniards had
largely ignored evangelization until the Dominicans began resisting Spanish policies in the New World.[26] 
Indeed, this conclusion seems to hold true.  Before Montesinos and Las Casas first questioned Spanish
methods and practices in the New World, no real resistance to the Spaniards’ tactics existed.  Afterward,
debates concerning Spanish colonialism began in earnest.  These debates have lasted well beyond the
sixteenth century, as people wrestle with the questions the Dominicans raised even today.  Without the
Dominican resistance, the Spanish crown likely would have heard little about the atrocities committed in the
New World.  As a result, the reforms in colonial law that came from Charles V in the 1500s would likely not
have happened.  The priests who spoke against Spanish practice served as a sort of national conscience,
imploring the Spanish to focus on evangelism, the one colonial goal the Spaniards had neglected for so long.
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In the popular rhyme about Henry VIII’s wives, Catherine Parr is remembered as just a footnote in
history, known more for having survived the King than for marrying him.  But the final spouse of the king
also accomplished much as queen, and no feat was more profound and important in her life than the influence
she exerted over her stepdaughter, Elizabeth.
While historians have never been timid in discussing and accurately documenting Catherine’s
relationship with the princess, they have not focused on the importance of that bond.  Indeed, Lacey Baldwin
Smith has stated “the Catherine Parr of legend--the wife . . . who reconciled [Henry] to his daughter
Elizabeth--is too good to be true.”1 In fact, Catherine’s influence on Elizabeth was important.  The
significance of the queen’s influence on Elizabeth is better understood by examining three major parts of their
relationship: Catherine’s control over the princess’s education, the correspondence between the two during
Catherine’s regency and Elizabeth’s expulsion from court, and the attitudes and feelings they had toward each
other.  When these pieces are taken in sum, Catherine was clearly the driving force in Elizabeth’s early life.    
The education of the royal children under Queen Catherine was of the highest quality, and, for
Elizabeth in particular, it was excellent.  Even before her father married Catherine Parr, Elizabeth had shown
herself to be a uniquely bright individual.  Although rambunctious and wild as a youth, the young princess
was exceptionally intelligent and had a natural love of history.2  As biographer Francis Hackett stated, she
was “born to play on the world as certain prodigies are born to play on the piano.”[3] Catherine cultivated
Elizabeth’s inherent intellect into something of substance.
With decisive shrewdness, Catherine took control over Elizabeth’s and her young brother Edward’s
education.  She implemented a humanistic, Protestant approach to their studies that had not been seen
previously during Henry’s reign.  Although irrevocably split from the Roman Catholic Church, England was
still more Catholic than Protestant.  The Six Articles of 1539, which affirmed communion, celibacy of the
clergy, private masses, and confession, marked a final rejection of Lutheran orthodoxy.[4]  Catherine herself
had held Protestant leanings for some years.  Being keen in mind and rational in her views, “it was perhaps
natural that she should favor the tenets of the new religion above the mysteries and intricacies
and…contemporary abuses of Catholicism.”[5]   Princess Mary, Elizabeth’s and Edward’s half-sister, was too
old and too much a part of England’s Catholic roots to be influenced by Parr’s educational efforts.  The two
younger children still had malleable minds, however, and were receptive to their stepmother’s instruction.[6] 
In 1544, Catherine reorganized the royal schoolrooms by moving the household to Hampton Court
and appointing William Grindal, a highly regarded Greek scholar, as tutor.  When Grindal died shortly
afterwards, Elizabeth asked to have Roger Ascham, Grindal’s mentor, as her tutor.[7]  Catherine had planned
for her attorney, Francis Goldsmith, to take up the job, but gave in to her stepdaughter and allowed Ascham
to teach her.[8]  By letting the princess have a choice in the matter, Parr cultivated her independence and
ultimately helped her develop into a future queen.[9]  The queen also appointed other humanists as tutors,
such as John Cheke, Richard Cox, and Anthony Cooke, along with Calvinist Jean Belmaine, in order to
maintain a steady stream of Protestant influences on the children.[10]
It is wrong to assume Catherine only supervised Elizabeth’s education, merely choosing tutors that
would educate in the lines of the Cambridge humanists.  In fact, she was the first to take an extremely active
role in the personal education of Elizabeth.  Historians, however, do not wholly agree with this assertion.  B.
W. Beckingsale said that it was Europe and England’s unique seventeenth-century experiences, not Catherine,
that most prominently contributed to Elizabeth’s educational upbringing.[11]  Beckingsale stated:
“[Elizabeth] was educated during those years when the men of the New Learning took advantage of the
destruction of the papal authority to assimilate the teaching of Luther and his followers.”[12]  According to
many historians, the Reformation movement and the humanistic teachers who rode in with it had the most
influence on Elizabeth.  Catherine was seen only as a supporting player during this crucial time in the girl’s
life, with Grindal, Ascham, and the other Protestant tutors taking center stage.  This conclusion is not well
founded, however, because these ecclesiastical scholars would have had no chance of entering Henry’s
conservative court and sculpting his children’s minds without Catherine’s assistance.  She was the chief
organizer of the royal schoolroom, bringing in educators who agreed with her religious views and practices. 
Those educators returned her benevolence by encouraging the royal children to write her regularly, describing
their progression.[13] Catherine’s encouragement both promoted and developed the young girl’s exceptional
ability to learn.[14]  She looked after Elizabeth and made sure that the impressionable princess was taught
and instructed in a Protestant-themed education. 
Elizabeth evidently took to these teachings with great enthusiasm.  She focused on religious works
and became prolific in translating various prayers and meditations selected by Parr.[15]  Neville Williams
believes Elizabeth’s proficiency in translating religious texts stemmed from her desire to gain Catherine’s
approval.[16]  Whether the princess delighted in Catherine’s educational reform is debatable, but it seems
clear that she delighted in Catherine’s attention.
The educational reforms Catherine implemented into the royal schoolrooms of Edward and Elizabeth
are nothing short of remarkable.  She recruited tutors sympathetic to her beliefs and worked with the children
on a personal level.  Historians have generally recognized this role, but have not considered its implications. 
Catherine’s “hands-on” approach in teaching Elizabeth made the unbendable, resilient girl open up to the
queen and allow herself to be taught the finer points of language, religion, culture, and royalty.  When
Catherine began overseeing all educational plans, Elizabeth was eleven.  This proved an optimal time to
instill in her the beliefs, values, and royal attributes she displayed as queen fifteen years later. Catherine
herself sheds light on her motives by telling Elizabeth, “God has given you great qualities, cultivate them
always, and labour to improve them, for I believe that you are destined by Heaven to be Queen of
England.”[17]  The present queen could definitely see the future queen being molded under her watchful eye.
The years 1543-44 brought many changes to the royal household that would solidify Catherine and
Elizabeth’s relationship.  In the summer of 1543, Henry banished Elizabeth from the court for a year after a
dispute between them.  The cause for the expulsion was unknown, but Katharine Anthony conceived two
possible scenarios.  First, Henry’s standards for his children were too high and he may have felt that
Elizabeth’s unruly spirit and carefree attitude were unfit and unwelcome. Secondly, Elizabeth was mature in
thought and growing quickly at a young age, and the king might have been reminded of her mother, Anne
Boleyn.  Anthony elaborated on this second reason when she said that Elizabeth, “with her prim mouth and
grown-up ways may have called the dead woman to life again.”[18]  Whether or not either scenario was true,
Catherine still made an effort to stay in contact with her stepdaughter.
It was during this period that Catherine began her regency over England.  In early 1544 Henry was
preparing to launch an invasion of France, an attack he led in person.[19]  By an ordinance of the Privy
Council in July of that year, Parr was appointed regent in Henry’s absence.  This gave the queen immediate
power over England and the necessary means to strengthen her bond with Elizabeth.  Catherine, however, did
not have permanent, supreme authority over England.  She was in fact only a temporary head of state, and
five special commissioners were appointed to advise her.[20]
  Before Henry left for battle, Parliament thought it dangerous and foolhardy for him to risk his life
with the royal succession “dependant on the life of a boy,” prince Edward, so the Third Succession Act was
issued.[21]  The order of succession under the Act gave the throne to Edward and his heirs, followed by Mary
and her heirs, and finally Elizabeth and her heirs, and “those Henry might designate by letters patent or
will.”[22]  On the surface, it looks as though Elizabeth was restored to her place in the royal succession and
all was well with the kingdom.  It could be argued that it did not matter whether Henry banished the princess
because the Act had supreme authority, leaving the issue moot.[23] 
Nevertheless, there was much more to the declaration.  First, Mary and Elizabeth may have had their
succession restored, but not their legitimacy.  In other words, Parliament could ignore legitimacy in
determining succession.  This may not have been much of an issue for the king, but it was a blow to the
spirits of his two daughters.  Second, Henry set conditions by letters patent or will, which his daughters
would have had to meet before becoming eligible to assume the throne.  Parliament gave Henry power  “to
establish impossible conditions for his daughters” to meet, thus further chilling his relationship with
them.[24]  The king bowed to the normal succession of his children, but established obstacles to their royal
inheritance.  Henry apparently thought of his daughters, especially the exiled Elizabeth, as second-rate
children.
With Henry at war in France, Catherine reigning as Queen Regent of England, and Elizabeth away in
exile at Ashridge, the setting was ideal for the queen to further strengthen her relationship with her
stepdaughter and ultimately bring her back into the royal circle.  While at Ashridge, Elizabeth wrote to
Catherine regularly.  She dared not write to her father, as she was frightened of possibly angering him again
in some way that would further their estrangement.  Instead, she pleaded for the queen to act as a liaison to
Henry.  Elizabeth’s earliest surviving letter was “a touching request for Catherine to intercede with her
father…to end some piece of misunderstanding.”[25] The princess must have been strengthened and
overjoyed when she learned that her stepmother “mentioned her to the king in every letter she wrote.”[26] 
Catherine, however, did more than write letters to the king, asking for his blessings.  She sent
Elizabeth many gifts and commissioned a portrait of the princess in an attempt to “remind the court of her
stepdaughter’s existence as well as her position as a daughter of the king.”[27]   Catherine also took great
care in sending her letters to Elizabeth by using another stepdaughter from a previous marriage, Margaret
Neville, to act as a liaison between the two.[28]  According to Susan E. James, Neville was “trustworthy,
young, and lively enough to provide compatible companionship for Elizabeth,” and thus was ideal for
carrying messages between Parr and Elizabeth.[29]  Clearly, the queen made it her top priority during this
time to mend Elizabeth’s wounded spirit and bring her back to the court. 
Catherine ultimately did pull Elizabeth out of exile, effectively ending her yearlong banishment. 
While this fact is not refuted, few historians consider it significant.  Elizabeth would have come back to court
eventually, some might say, and it just happened during Parr’s regency.  Still, it did not just happen under
Catherine’s watch; it happened because it was under her watch.  Catherine’s pleadings with Henry to forgive
Elizabeth were the ultimate cause of the reunion.  The king eventually agreed, giving his daughter permission
to go to Greenwich to be with the queen and her half-sister Mary.  In July of 1544, Elizabeth traveled to
London and joined Catherine at St. James’s Palace.  In a letter to the queen she stated that her exile had
deprived her “for a whole year of your most illustrious presence, and…yet has robbed me of the same
good.”[30] 
The high regard Elizabeth had for Catherine during this time is quite evident in the religious
translations she produced as a gift for the queen on New Year’s Day of the following year.  Elizabeth’s
translation of the French meditation “The Mirror of a Sinful Soul” was a painstakingly long and dull project,
one in which the princess must have taken great pains to produce.[31]  While the verses were humanistic and
Protestant, giving evidence to Elizabeth’s education and tutoring under Catherine, more important was her
humility in presenting the gift to her stepmother.  Elizabeth knew the work was not perfect, but hoped Parr
would “rub out, polish and mend the words . . . which I know in many places rude.”[32]  The translation was
inscribed, “To our noble and virtuous Queen Katherine, Elizabeth her humble daughter wishes perpetual
felicity and everlasting joy,” further testifying to the respect and adulation she had for the queen.[33]
Catherine received Elizabeth’s gift with great pleasure, and was “deeply touched that she had gone to
such trouble” in translating the piece.[34]  In truth, the effort was the culmination of more than a year’s worth
of growing friendship between the two.  It was a friendship guided by and orchestrated by Catherine.  In light
of the events of 1544, one can clearly see the unmistakable influence the queen had in bringing Elizabeth
back into the royal family.  Given the title of Queen Regent during Henry’s campaign in France, she took it
upon herself to use the short time she had as “interim ruler” to strengthen her relationship with her
stepdaughter.  Through letters of endearment, numerous gifts, and her ability to reunite her stepdaughter with
the rest of the family, she showed the full measure of her influence over Elizabeth. 
After the events of 1543-44, Catherine became more than a loving mother, but also a political mentor. 
Both had grown closer in mind and heart, and their attitudes toward each other reflected this union. Hackett is
correct in stating that Catherine “possessed the odd gift that can turn any one not a monster into a human
being—the solvency of good will.”[35]  Elizabeth was certainly no monster, and Catherine’s ability to not
only love and cherish the girl but also clear the path for her future reign gives credence to her “good will.”  In
fact, it seems as though the stepmother and stepdaughter understood each other better than anyone else
could.  Both were “wholly English” and Protestants. Further, both were well educated in the curriculum of
the time.[36]  It was Elizabeth’s keen ability to closely observe the queen in action that would have the most
lasting effects on her and eventually become the foundation in her own sovereignty. 
Anne Boleyn, now long dead and not even a memory, was no match for the caring and affectionate
love Catherine provided the girl so early in life.[37]  The princess, as young as she was, had seen many
queens, tutors, caretakers, and even love interests of her father come and go, with none leaving the mark that
Catherine did.  James goes even further by saying that Elizabeth, during her own reign, would mirror
Catherine’s attempts to be at the same time both the devoted Christian woman and the aggressive powerful
leader.[38]  It seemed that Elizabeth had Catherine in mind when she ascended the throne.
Historians have accurately documented the relationship of the two women, but many do not
adequately stress Catherine’s importance.  They have only shed a dim light on the story, leaving a large part
barely seen and wholly obscure.  When all is taken into account, a different story appears: a strong,
intelligent, and shrewd woman using her position to mold a princess and future queen. 
Catherine Parr was much more than simply a strong influence on Elizabeth’s early years.  She molded
the unrefined little girl into a young woman, and instilled in her all of the intellectual, religious, and political
qualities of a queen.  Catherine was the one teacher the princess truly learned from, the one queen she would
most ardently emulate, and the one woman she could ever truly call “mother.”  Elizabeth’s life would have
been different had Catherine not graced it.  She would have grown up without a Protestant upbringing,
without a commanding queen to imitate, and without a tender and devoted stepmother to call her own.  James
correctly stated that “[Catherine’s] influence on Elizabeth’s life and education was seminal,” but that simple
statement is insufficient.[39]  Her influence was indeed crucial, but James’ statement only attested to the
initial impact of the relationship, not its ultimate effects on Elizabeth’s career.  As a child, Parr told her own
mother, “My hands are ordained to touch crowns and scepters, not needles and spindles.”[40]  Catherine’s
youthful prophecy would eventually come true, and when it did, she immediately began ordaining those
“crowns and scepters” for Elizabeth’s head and hands.
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            The English Civil Wars and Regicide, 1642-49, has been viewed as one of the “great” revolutions. 
Like the French and Russian Revolutions, the earlier English Revolution saw protests against the government
coalesce into armed rebellion, civil war, and then the overthrow of the old order, including the execution of
the monarch and establishment of the new rule.  In these great Revolutions, historians have pointed to
revolutionary moments, such as the peasant uprisings in France in the summer and fall of 1789.  To Marxist
historians like Christopher Hill, these peasant uprisings act as a prelude, or stepping stone, to a larger social
revolution.
            In the English Civil Wars, which pitted the supporters of the King (Royalists, or Cavaliers) against the
Roundhead Parliamentarians, some might point to the rise of the 1644 Clubmen in the countryside as just
such a lower class, agrarian revolutionary moment.  This paper uses the demands and actions of the Clubmen
as a test case to see if definitions of revolution apply to such a group.  It also compares them to the French
peasant revolts of the mid-seventeenth century, such as the Nu Pieds, in order to question the general
revolutionary content of agrarian movements in the early modern period.   
            This essay falls back on historian Perez Zagorin’s broader and more inclusive definition of
revolution.  When one glances at Zagorin’s broad definition of what constitutes a revolution, the Clubmen of
the 17th Century seemingly fit it in a limited manner.  But were the Clubmen truly revolutionary?  Did these
men understand the larger context as to why England was embroiled in a colossal civil war, or comprehend
the loftier ambitions of the leading parliamentarians and royalists battling for control of the kingdom?  Upon
a more in-depth examination of Zagorin’s hypothesis, one can make a much more definitive case for the
Clubmen being more riotous than revolutionary.
            The Clubmen reacted to a war which they saw primarily as an infringement upon local traditions and
customs that they held dear and wished to continue unimpeded.  Although many of the Clubmen groups
favored one side or the other, all were committed to an early peace.  A preference for King or Parliament did
not preclude a preference for peace above both.  Petitions drawn up by Clubmen associations clamored for a
restoration of normal government: the abolition of county committees and of new taxes, the restoration of
jury trial and ancient local institutions, and measures restoring regional economies.[1]  Clearly the Clubmen,
when compared to similar peasant riots in France at the time, or to the more revolutionary demands made by
their fellow countrymen, the Levellers, do not live up to revolutionary billing.
            The Clubmen’s satisfaction with the status quo supports the idea that most of the English were either
ignorant of, or unconcerned with, the national implications of the English Civil War.  Historian Charles
Carlton perhaps best illustrates this attitude in the following remarks:
During the 1640s most people in the British Isles were more concerned with the mundane happenings
within their own orbits than with the earth shattering events outside.  If politics attracted more of their
attention than it had before, most folk were nonetheless far more concerned with buying and selling,
making love,  money and marriages,  having and bringing up children,  seeing friends and paying
bills.[2]
English historian H.N. Brailsford concurs, stating that “To understand this period, the most exciting chapter
in our national history, we have to realize that the mass, the great majority of the English population, were
political illiterates who had endured the civil war as neutrals, understanding little of the issues.”[3] 
Renowned civil war historian David Underdown agrees:
The rioters’ primary objective is now thought to be the preservation of a vanished, just order
of society, a mythical merry England in which landlords and grain dealers do not cheat or
oppress  the  poor,  and in  which both monarch and gentry uphold the  traditional  laws and
regulatory structures of the old “moral economy”.  The civil war political group expressing
typically “popular” values is not the democratic Levellers, but the conservative Clubmen.[4]
 
Historian John Morrill echoes these sentiments, emphasizing the apathy felt by most during the conflict,
arguing “A majority had no deep-seated convictions behind their choice of side.”[5]  Many in England
simply chose to support the faction they felt gave them the best opportunity to preserve the status quo;
whether it be royalists, parliamentarians, or local neutralists such as the Clubmen.  These esteemed historians
clearly illustrate the fact that many “ordinary” Englishmen were unconcerned with fomenting revolutionary
ideas.  The Clubmen certainly exemplify this reasoning. 
            Contemporary writers also conveyed the populace’s penchant for indifference and apathy.  Thomas
Hobbes, one of the most influential authors of the period, maintained that there were few common people
who cared much for either side, adding that conscripted common soldiers, “had not much mind to fight, but
were glad of any occasion to make haste home.”[6]  Is it reasonable then to believe that the Clubmen were
passionate enough to exhibit revolutionary tendencies?  A parliamentarian newsletter journalist stated the
contrary by dismissing the Clubmen as “neutrals and such as like weathercockes they will turn this way and
that with every blast; and will, I conceive, be ready to close in with the prevailing party, without respect to
truth or justice.”[7]  A contemporary tale of the period further emphasizes the futility in attempting to prove
commoners had a vested interest in the outcome of the civil war.  Such a lack of interest, according to the
story, was voiced by a yokel who was plowing Marston Moor the morning before the epoch battle.  Told to
flee because the king and parliament needed his fields to fight on, the surprised rustic asked, “What!  Has
them two buggars fallen out?”[8]  Certainly the message of this tale is that the common man was perhaps not
only apolitical but uninformed as well.
            Were the Clubmen then, truly a revolutionary phenomenon?  Perez Zagorin defines a revolution as the
following:
Any attempt by subordinate groups through the use of violence to bring about (1) a change of
government or its policy, (2) a change of regime, or (3) a change of society, whether this
attempt is justified by reference to past conditions or to an as yet unattained future ideal.[9] 
As stated earlier, the Clubmen do fit this definition, but in a limited manner.  When one examines primary
documents, petitions and resolutions written by various Clubmen associations, their demands fulfill only a
few components of Zagorin’s analysis of what constitutes a revolutionary situation.          
Perhaps the most useful primary source available is The Desires and Resolutions of the Clubmen of
the Counties of Dorset and Wiltshire.  Historian Ronald Hutton, who has devoted much time studying the
Clubmen, claims those of the Dorset-Wiltshire band to be “the most sophisticated of all English Clubmen
associations.”[10]  This document reveals some basic desires of the participants, yet insufficient for fulfilling
Zagorin’s revolutionary scenario.
Clubmen movements broke out in parts of the country that, as one of their leaders put it, had “more
deeply tasted the misery of this unnatural and intestine war.”[11]  One would be hard-pressed to find a group
of people more adversely affected by the consequences of the bloody civil war than the inhabitants of the
counties of Dorset and Wiltshire counties.  These two counties were located in an area where parliamentarian
roundheads and royalist cavaliers battled frequently.  Soldiers in both armies, often times underpaid and ill
equipped, raided the inhabitants of these counties and plundered small communities in their path.
Nobody was spared.  An aged laborer made a pathetic inventory of his household goods, all of which
had been stolen by parliamentarian soldiers:
7 pairs of sheets, 3 brass kettles, 2 brass pots, 5 pewter dishes, 4 shirts, 4 smocks, 2 coats, 1 cloak, 1
waistcoat, 7 dozen candles, 1 frying pan, 1 spit, 2 pairs of pot hooks, 1 peck of wheat, 4 bags, some
oatmeal, some salt, a basketful of eggs, bowls, dishes, spoons, ladles, drinking pots, and whatsoever
else they could lay their hands on. 
Houses had been taken over as army quarters, and their original inhabitants ejected; crops had been trampled
down by marching men or eaten by cavalry horses; taxes had been imposed and levies extracted by both
sides; women had been violated and the rapists haphazardly punished.[12]  It is therefore not surprising that
men in these ravaged villages formed the Clubmen associations in an attempt to stop the atrocities.
Morrill asserts that the primary task of the Clubmen was to prevent their own shires from becoming
major battlegrounds.[13]  This assessment is clearly stated in The Desires and Resolutions of the Clubmen of
the Counties of Dorset and Wiltshire.  In this document the Clubmen express their desire first and foremost to
end the war because of the fact that for three years the people inhabiting those counties admitted,
by free quarter and plunder of souldiers our purses have bin exhausted, corn eaten up, cattell
plundered, persons frighted from our habitacons and by reason of the violence of the soldiers our lives
are not safe, & have noe power nor authority to resist the same, nor releeved or secured upon any
complaynts whereby we are disabled to pay our rents, just debts, or to mainteyne our wifes and
famylyes from utter ruin and decay.[14] 
Not surprisingly, the document reveals a strong desire to end the plunder by both King and Parliament so as
to “peaceably return to their wonted habitations and to the obedience of the established laws.”[15]  While it
may seem revolutionary to some that the Clubmen leaders enumerated their desires in such a manner, it is
clear that they wish only to preserve their local situation, regardless of political happenings elsewhere in
England.  These demands express a communal desire to return to the status quo enjoyed prior to hostilities.
Upon examining these resolutions, successful implementation of the Clubmen into Zagorin’s
revolutionary model becomes difficult at best.  It is clear that violence did occur between the Clubmen and
outside forces.  In fact, as many as six hundred were killed in the war.[16]  While the Clubmen certainly
aspired to change the policy of war, the resolutions make no mention of advocating a monumental change in
government policy or of ending the regime of Charles I.  They certainly were not calling for a major change
in society and spoke much to restoring obedience to pre-Civil War laws.  Underdown confirms this sentiment
when he suggests that Clubmen of all areas, royalist or parliamentarian, had much in common: a firm
attachment to ancient rights and customs, a vague nostalgia for the good old days of Queen Elizabeth, and an
unquestioning acceptance of social order.[17]  Morrill agrees with these conclusions stating, “the Clubmen
petitions show a yearning for settlement, but had nothing new to offer.”[18] 
If Clubmen were not a revolutionary situation, one must look elsewhere to properly classify them. 
Zagorin’s definition of a riot seems a more appropriate fit for the Clubmen occurrence.  Zagorin argues that
riots differ from a rebellion in the following ways.  First, they are mostly spontaneous protests in which
planning and organization are minimal or nonexistent.  Second, they are usually brief, lasting a day or two at
the most.  Third, their aims, if any, are often nonpolitical.  Lastly, as spontaneous outbursts of popular anger,
the nature of their protests predominate any instrumental purpose.[19]  The actions and resolutions of the
Clubmen thus satisfy the requirements of this riotous scenario better than the aforementioned revolutionary
one.
            Evidence is abundant concerning the spontaneous reaction of the Clubmen towards the war.  Several
historians have argued that the Clubmen were purely a local phenomenon with scant evidence of widespread
organization.  Hutton cites the confusion and lack of cohesiveness by stating, “when they actually rose
against troops they did so in small sects of villages, under different local leaders and with no common plan of
action.”[20]  Underdown, focusing on the three-county area of Dorset, Somerset, and Wiltshire, contends,
that the “Peace-keeping associations” of Clubmen bent on protecting their homes and communities from
destruction emerged “spontaneously” in all three counties.[21]  These examples support the fact that little
planning accompanied the creation of these Clubmen groups.
            Although Clubmen associations existed in ten counties during much of 1645, evidence suggests that
their riotous flare-ups were short lived and unsuccessful.  Morrill insists they were never an effective military
force.[22]  Possibly the best example of the impotence of the Clubmen’s military response to their adversaries
occurred at Hambledon Hill in August of 1645, where they were easily defeated by the famed
parliamentarian general Oliver Cromwell.  After initial negotiations proved futile, Cromwell’s forces routed
an association of Dorset Clubmen numbering around two thousand, a force that nearly doubled that of
Cromwell’s.  The victorious general described the ease of the victory in a letter he wrote to his colleague Sir
Thomas Fairfax on 4 August:
I believe killed not twelve of them, but cut very many and put them all to flight.  We have taken about
three hundred; many of which are poor silly creatures, whom if you please to let send home, they
promise to be very dutiful for time to come, and will be hanged before they come out again.[23] 
This episode illustrates that the biggest fight the clubmen militia could muster during the conflict ended in
disaster; it was essentially a riot that lasted less than a day.
            The Clubmen also seem to fit the third ingredient of Zagorin’s definition of a riot.  Their targets of
affection, or detestation, often depended on their unique local situations.  This is most evident in
Underdown’s “chalk and cheese” theory, which he applied to Wilthsire, Dorset, and Somerset counties. The
historian contends that the Clubmen most friendly to the royalist forces were from the “chalk” – nucleated
settlements of the down lands.  Those most friendly to the parliamentarians were from the “cheese” –
fen-edge villages and clothing parishes of the wood-pasture region.[24]  Historian Simon Osborne breaks
down the geographic patterns even more with his in-depth study of the proximity of Clubmen associations to
various garrisons in the Midlands region.  He claims that pinpointing areas of Clubmen strength and
allegiance in the region becomes more complex when one takes into account the number of opposing
garrisons juxtaposed in the hotly contested territory.[25]  These arguments support the spontaneity of the
Clubmen responses, suggesting they were not entirely neutral.  Rather, they selected their friends and foes
based upon specific situations prevalent in each county.  Each predicament and subsequent Clubmen response
could therefore change at any given moment.  Geography, opportunism, and self-interest then, likely led
many Clubmen in England to lend their swords and talents to what looked like the stronger side at the
time.[26]  As for the political aims of the Clubmen, the Dorset/Wiltshire Resolutions revealed the absence of
them, especially at the national level. 
            As for the fourth and final component of Zagorin’s riotous situation, we have already witnessed the
spontaneity with which the Clubmen associations often times were formulated.  When conceptualizing the
Clubmen it seems clear that they adequately fulfill Zagorin’s definition of a riot.  It would also be fair to say
that the associations fall short of completing the historian’s revolutionary components.
            In fact, the Clubmen were most like the Nu-Pied peasant riots occurring in Normandy, France in
1639.  The Nu-Pieds therefore offer another example with which one can test Zagorin’s definitions.  The two
movements mirror one another in many ways.  Historian Ronald Mousnier describes these uprisings against
new salt taxes imposed by the King, and the quartering of royal soldiers who came to collect the gabelle, as
primarily regional, a contention not unlike the arguments made of the Clubmen by Underdown and Osborne. 
In fact, Underdown’s chalk and cheese rationalization applies to Normandy as well.  The Bocage, or cheese
region, exhibited much of the topographical features that Underdown argued fomented rebellious tendencies. 
Moreover, the Normandy inhabitants, much like their English brethren, vehemently attacked plundering
soldiers that committed excesses, abuses, and malpractices against them.[27]
            Like the Clubmen, the Nu-Pieds attempted to form local militia associations to defend intrusions from
outside their localities.  The Nu-Pieds formed The Army of Suffering in July of 1639, a force resembling the
Clubmen’s Peaceable Army assembled in the summer of 1645.  Mobilization of these militia was conducted
in much the same manner as bells were sounded to hastily summon them in defense of their respective
village.  In the end however, royal forces easily defeated the Nu-Pieds, similar to Cromwell’s victory over the
Clubmen.
            Mousnier maintains that the major concern of the Nu-Pieds, like their English cohorts, was the fear of
external forces.  In the French case this concerned an overpowering central government infringing upon their
local customs and traditions.[28]  In order to thwart these incursions, this riotous group not only raised a local
army, but also composed poetry and compiled mottos to better inspire their ranks.  A popular Clubmen sonnet
bluntly stated:
If you offer to plunder or take our cattle,
Be assured we will bid you battle.[29]
A Nu-Pied verse declared:
Help a brave nu-pieds,
Show that your towns are full
Of men of war zealous
To fight under his banner.
You see that everything is ready
For a fight to the death for freedom.
Like Rouen, Valognes, and Chartres,
Since they treat you with severity,
If you do not defend your charters,
Normans you are no men of courage.[30]
Despite these literary efforts, the Nu-Pieds encountered the same fate as the Clubmen and were easily routed
by the King’s army by the end of 1639.
            These riotous groups did not represent a revolutionary situation.  Zagorin himself admits that the
Nu-Pieds fall short of his vague, all-encompassing definition of revolution.[31]  The Clubmen demands pale
in comparison to those personified by their more revolutionary-minded countrymen, the Levellers.  The
Agreement of the People, written by the Levellers in 1647, speaks to a radical change in national policy, one
with more political representation by the masses.[32]  Leveller spokesman Col. Thomas Rainsborough and
conservative parliamentarian Henry Ireton took part in one of the war’s most spirited and revolutionary
debates in October 1647.  The two argued the extent to which popular sovereignty should be implemented in
post-war England.  The two also thrashed out such issues as the “overthrow of the fundamental constitution”
and talked of “avoiding” monarchy and kings.[33]  These sentiments seem more in step with Zagorin’s
revolutionary scenario and seem to dwarf the requests of the Clubmen.  So if the conservatism of the
Clubmen was to prove more characteristic of the later 1640s than the iconoclasm of the Levellers, as Morrill
contends, how can one say they were revolutionary?
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The French Revolution spurred people around the world to question their established governments in
the late eighteenth-century. Thomas Paine defended the French Revolution in The Rights of Man (1791).  But
Paine’s work was an attempted rebuttal of Edmund Burke’s Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790),
which questioned the application of revolution to Britain. Burke felt that history showed the true strength of
Britain since she had been a power to contend with for many years and was, in fact, becoming more
powerful.  Compared with Britain’s long period of success, Burke believed that the new French government
was too young to propose changes in other countries, especially since France had ignored its own history. 
Paine, on the other hand, claimed that the British government was holding onto outdated ideas of the past,
therefore refusing to let its people live for the future.  While Paine’s argument might appear the more
progressive and democratic today, Burke’s argument deserves to be taken seriously, especially as it was
popularized by writers like Hannah More.
At age 61, Burke published his response to the French revolution not for “France in the first instance,
but this country,” Britain.[1]  He wrote Reflections more to prove the British were right in their aversion to
revolution than that the French were wrong.  In fact, he felt that the French should have modeled themselves
after the British in staging their change in government.  The French failed, he believed, because the National
Assembly had “a power to make a constitution which shall conform to their design . . . instead of finding
themselves obliged to conform to a fixed constitution.”[2]  This lack of strict reorganization led to a wrong
start in the new government and to abuses of the system.  Without a strict constitution to conform to, the
National Assembly had no such restriction.
Also, Burke argued that to have ensured a successful revolution, France should have looked at its past
to fix the problems that had previously occurred.  Instead, the French set a precedent to start fresh each
revolution, but “people will not look forward to posterity, who never look backward to their ancestors.”[3] 
Burke felt that England’s Glorious Revolution of 1688-89 showed how one could improve a government
without a complete or violent renovation.  At that time, “England found itself without a king . . . [but] did not,
however, dissolve the whole fabric” of government when compensating for this loss.[4]  Instead, the country
proceeded with the Revolution “to preserve our antient indisputable laws and liberties.”[5]  The British
wanted to fix what was broken, but saw the importance in keeping what had been working all along.
            The French, however, did not wish to look back at the past and allow history to guide their new,
fragile government, according to Burke.  Paine conversely, did not see the importance in conforming to the
past.  He stated that, “it is the living, and not the dead, that are to be accommodated.”[6]  Paine also claimed
that England was born from “a race of conquerors, whose government, like that of William the Conqueror,
was founded in power.”[7]  He insisted that one should “review the governments which arise out of society,
in contradistinction to those which arose out of superstition and conquest.”[8] While Paine was correct as far
as his example of 1066, he refused to see how far Britain has come in the time since William’s reign. 
Concerning the value of history, Paine also needed to realize that
the science of government [is] a matter which requires experience, and even more experience than any
person can gain in his whole life. . . . It is with infinite caution that any man ought to venture upon
pulling down an edifice which has answered in any tolerable degree for ages the common purpose of
society.[9]
Moreover, Burke argued that inheritance had been shown to work in Britain’s past.  Each family had a
title and rank based on how far back its ancestors could be traced in the country, again showing the
importance of history in British government.  The British were eligible for the House of Lords, in the British
Parliament, based on their family’s status throughout history.   He stated that pivotal documents, such as the
Magna Carta (1215) and the 1689 Declaration of Rights, “assert our liberties, as an entailed inheritance
derived to us from our forefathers.”  Burke’s argument hinged on property and inheritance: “We have an
inheritable crown; an inheritable peerage . . . and a people inheriting privileges, franchises and liberties from
a long line of ancestors.”[10]  This had worked for centuries for Britain, and France was mistaken to lecture
Britain on how the country should be ruled.
Paine rightly questioned inheritance, believing that “titles are but nicknames.”[11]  According to
Burke however, the British felt they kept history alive and “that the idea of inheritance furnishes a sure
principle of conservation, and a sure principle of transmission; without at all excluding a principle of
improvement.”[12]  Titles and the aristocracy form the House of Lords, offset by the House of Commons for
those without titles.  Despite Paine’s hatred for nobility, it was an important principle around which the
British system was set.
Hannah More aimed ideas similar to those of Burke at the lower classes of Britain.  More placed a
Burke-Paine debate in the dialog of two villagers.  When Tom the mason heard of France’s ideas of liberty
and reform, he immediately called for “a new constitution. . . . I want liberty and equality and the rights of
man.”[13]  Tom suggested that Britain should follow France’s example, but blacksmith Jack would “sooner
go to the Negroes to get learning or to the Turks for freedom and happiness.”[14]  Here, More echoed
Burke’s idea that the French should have tried to emulate the British, but came upon a new idea for
government and felt the need to force it on others.
Tom also supported France in its aim “for a perfect government,” but Jack explained, “you might as
well cry for the moon.  There’s nothing perfect in this world [but] . . . we come nearer to it than any country
in the world ever did.”[15]  By examining past governments and how the world was changing, Jack made the
case that the British were wiser for sticking to what worked and amending what did not.  The lower class read
this argument about history, and was thereby exposed to Burke’s views on proper governmental change.
Burke’s fear of the new French government stemmed from his constitutional beliefs.  He stated that,
while King George III’s actions regarding the colonies “were not against the letter of the constitution, they
were all the more against it in spirit.”[16]  Burke felt that Britain held loosely onto their legal rights, but
needed to examine how to properly deal with the colonies.  Similarly, Burke felt the new French system was
not specific enough to determine the letter of the law.  Burke saw this as a weakness in the new government,
and felt that the lack of strictness would further harm the new system by not requiring adherence to a
constitution.
The French Revolution might also be seen as a compliment to the American Revolution that had
ended officially in 1783.  But, in fact, the Americans handled their revolution similarly to the British, as they
attempted “to perfect the work of history [while] the French opted for the far more radical experiment of a
philosophical break with the past that would create the world anew.”[17]  Coming from Britain, the
Americans knew history’s importance in determining the future.  The colonists used what they felt worked in
the British system, then changed what they felt needed improvement. Again, the French became so caught up
with their “new” ideas of government, they did not think to examine how such systems had fared in the past.
Burke and Paine differ over the lessons that the French Revolution held for Britain.  Paine insisted
that it brought up the fundamentals that should exist in a government, which Britain lacked.  He saw
corruption and a conquering monarchy that had existed for too long.  Burke claimed that the revolution
simply showcased idealism that had gone too far.  He felt the French should have followed Britain’s
thoughtful handling of the Glorious Revolution, in which they sought a diplomatic answer to the succession
of the crown.
Burke’s strength lay in his acceptance and study of history.  He saw the importance of reflection and
analysis of the past workings of the government in question. Slight change or reform was more beneficial to a
state than a dramatic revolution.  Britain realized this concept ages before, which is why she had remained so
strong.  If the French had asked for Burke’s opinion on them before their uprising, he would have had his
“countrymen rather to recommend to our neighbors the example of the British Constitution, than to take
models from them on the improvement of our own.”[18]
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To change masters is not to be free. – Jose Marti, 1895.
 
            In 1895 the third major Cuban insurrection in thirty years erupted against the Spanish.  In 1898, as the
Cubans were preparing a final assault on Spanish urban strongholds, the United States declared war on Spain,
invaded Cuba, and began a military  occupation that remained until 1902.  Early U.S. histories of the
intervention and occupation portrayed the Americans as altruistic, magnanimous, and brave. The same
narratives viewed the Cubans as unsophisticated, uneducated, and incapable of either successful military
action or self-governance.  These American views of both Cuban and American motivations were simplistic
and marked by an absence of Cuban perspectives. The period in which these events occurred was significant.
This era marked the height of new imperialism elsewhere around the globe.  The Europeans were busy neatly
sub-dividing Africa during these years, and as Spain labored to cling to her few remaining colonies, the
United States was looking beyond her continental borders to continue the expansionism that had marked the
republic since its founding.
            Later writers, particularly Hispanic historians, described the American intervention more accurately
as neo-colonialism, a new and more subtle but equally devastating form of imperialism in which an imperial
power exerted indirect control through political, economic and cultural influence.  Americans ironically
justified their intervention as anti-colonial in nature, claiming they were going to save the Cubans from the
Spanish and give them a better life.    
            The United States had already established a significant economic and cultural presence in Cuba by
1898, and the insurrection threatened that investment.  The American intervention and occupation succeeded
in not only interrupting and altering the Cuban independence movement, but utilized military force, economic
coercion, and paternalistic attitudes to substitute American for Spanish hegemony in Cuba.  In so doing, the
United States preserved not only its economic investment, but also the underlying social order of Spanish
colonialism.  The United States invested significant manpower and money to rebuild a devastated Cuba, and
expected gratitude and security in return. They exerted the force necessary to achieve those goals, while
preserving traditional colonial inequities and reaping huge financial rewards.  The roots of American
involvement on Cuban soil began many decades before the military actions of 1898, and had a profound
influence on Cuban society that has lasted to this day.  Whether or not the American dominance is viewed as
beneficial to the Cuban people the Cubans were not given a choice.  Paternalism and self-interest played a
much larger role in American policy than humanitarianism.
            The United States had had designs on the Caribbean and on Cuba in particular from the earliest days
of the American republic.  The primary concern was that Cuba might pass into the possession of another,
more threatening, colonial power such as England.  The Monroe Doctrine (1823) enunciated these concerns. 
Europeans were warned not to interfere with American interests in the region.  Secretary of State John
Quincy Adams wrote to the Spanish minister that year: 
These islands [Cuba and Puerto Rico] from their local position are natural
appendages to the North American continent, and one of them, Cuba, almost in sight of our shores,
from a multitude of considerations, has become an object of transcendent importance to the
commercial and political interests of our Union.[1]
Annexation was a common political theme from the earliest days, as noted by Thomas Jefferson, also
in 1823: “I have ever looked on Cuba as the most interesting addition which could ever be made to our
system of states.”[2]  In these early days, however, Spain rebuked the United States’ repeated attempts to
purchase the island and America balked at taking it by force.  A Congressional bill in 1859 made the
acquisition of Cuba a priority.  “The ultimate acquisition of Cuba may be considered a fixed purpose of the
United States--a purpose resulting from political and geographical necessities.”[3]  The presence of Spain in
the Caribbean was tolerated because it was seen as non-threatening to the United States. A declining colonial
power, Spain had already lost the bulk of her empire by the mid-nineteenth century.  With America’s
increased trade and investments in Cuba, the status quo was acceptable.  The United States by this time had
become Cuba’s number one trading partner.
The increased American presence in Cuba during the mid-1800s can be traced directly sugar
production.  The industrialization of this key industry deepened the bonds between the states and the island. 
As in so many other colonial settings, the export value of a particular agricultural commodity led to
specialization.  Sugar became the cash crop of Cuba, and resulted in a consolidation of plantations, more
acreage devoted to sugar, and a decline in small farming operations and the planting of basic food crops.[4] 
The need for labor also increased, resulting in a further proliferation of slavery and the slave trade. The
Americans brought technological advances in sugar production that resulted in a  wave of immigration and
investment. Railroads, steam power, and the telegraph all contributed to the booming sugar industry.  
American workers came to Cuba to design, build, and operate the sugar mills.[5]  American companies,
supported by Creole (native white Cubans) landowners and American financiers and professionals, developed
the Sugar Trust.  Corporate mill towns controlled local politics through bribes, graft, and employment
guarantees.[6]  North American capital and culture expanded into other areas as well.  The Creole ruling class
sent their children to America for education, and as the 1868 insurrection deepened, many Creoles emigrated
to the states.
In 1868, the first of three uprisings against the Spanish caused a serious threat to the status quo.  The
Ten Years War raged across Cuba from 1868 until 1878, and decimated the country. In 1878 the insurrection
faltered.  The Spanish, financially overextended and lacking support at home, agreed to reforms in the Treaty
of Zanjon.[7] Following the treaty, American capital rebuilt much of the country and solidified American
cultural and financial influence. The war had ruined the Cuban economy, and, despite American investment,
the Spanish demands for taxes to pay for the war and continued military activities drove thousands of
peasants and small farmers into intractable debt.  The separatists who participated in the uprising found their
land confiscated, resulting in their mass emigration to the United States.  Jose Marti, a rebel leader, was
exiled and spent the next seventeen years in Europe and the United States building the Cuban Revolutionary
Party (PRC).  A second war of independence in 1879 was short lived and again unsuccessful.  By the
mid-1880’s, the separatist movement expanded to include many Creole landowners.  The Cuban elite was
struggling under Spanish rule and resented its failure to institute reforms, which included the promise of
political participation.  
Funded by exiled Cuban communities in the United States, and despite  differences in motivation, the
separatist movements united in the desire to rid the island once and for all of the Spanish.  The Creole elite,
having enjoyed the fruits of the colonial system, favored annexation to the United States.  They desired to
maintain the social and economic systems that had been so profitable, and questioned the ability of the Cuban
people to effectively govern themselves.[8]  A second group of the separatists clung to the idea of eventual
independence, but believed that a short American protectorate would be necessary to prepare the Cubans for
self-government.[9] A third group, the independistas,  had been at the heart of the insurrectionist movement
and believed that complete independence from both Spain and the United States was required.  Led by Marti,
the new vision of “Cuba Libre” encompassed not just shedding the Spanish yoke, but replacing the colonial
social and economic structure.  Marti wrote in 1892: “Through the gates we exiles open will enter Cubans
with a radical soul of the new country.  Our goal is not so much a mere political change as a good, sound, and
just and equitable system.”[10]  Historian Louis Perez wrote in Cuba Between Empires:
Marti was not merely attempting to overthrow Spanish rule; he aspired to
nothing less than a fundamental change in Cuban politics by creating new ways
of mobilizing and sharing power.  Independence was to produce the republic
and the republic stood for political democracy, social justice, and economic
freedom.  Marti transformed a rebellion into a revolution.[11]
In 1895, Marti and Generals Gomez, Garcia, and Maceo, having built a military force under the
direction of the PRC, invaded Cuba. The rebel armies gained control of the countryside, elected a civil
government, and began to force the Spanish army to withdraw to a few urban enclaves.  The unity Marti had
woven between the disparate threads of Cuban separatists began to slowly unravel with his death in battle late
in 1895, as American politicians began to debate the “Cuban problem.”
The insurrection of 1895 was more organized and enjoyed wider Cuban support than earlier
rebellions.  The rebels’ strategy was to destroy the sugar industry, remove the Spanish access to revenue, and
force their return to Spain.  Horatio Rubens, PRC minister in Washington, D.C., wrote in 1898:
The guerilla warfare peculiarly adapted to the physical conditions of the island,
the gradual decimating of Spain’s forces, and the cutting off of all sources of
her revenue from Cuba, has been the means on which Cubans have relied in
their confident anticipation of ultimate triumph.[12]
 
Spain’s response arrived in the form of General Valeriano Weyler.  He took over command of the
Spanish forces in December of 1895 and immediately “adopted the infamous system of reconcentration
which, under his supervision, became a process of direct starvation of the Island people.”[13]  The policy
ordered all rural workers into camps near or in Spanish urban fortresses.  His ruthless campaign resulted in
social and financial upheaval, and proved to be the final straw for even Spain’s most loyal planters.  Without
workers to harvest and process the sugar crop, and no protection for their embattled plantations, even the elite
Creoles joined the separatists in the hope that United States’ annexation would save their privileged status
and whatever assets remained.  
Throughout the thirty years of civil strife the United States refused to recognize the independence
movement, and had covertly and steadily supported the Spanish as they struggled to retain their hold on
Cuba.  American policy, which claimed neutrality, was actually designed to encourage Spanish reforms
within the colonial structure. In December, 1897, President William McKinley, fearing the impact of an
independent Cuba on American investments and security, urged that “Spain be left free to conduct military
operations and grant political reforms, while the United States for its part shall enforce its neutral obligations
and cut off the assistance the insurgents receive from this country.”[14]  Since Spain had outlawed all Cuban
ownership of firearms, and since the guns and money to operate the insurgency came from Cuban exiles in
the United States, McKinley’s policy was tantamount to a declaration of war on the insurrectionists.
The U.S. government position, however, did not reflect the public distaste for Weyler’s campaign of
attrition.  On one hand, the American people were clamoring for American intervention on behalf of the
Cuban people, while the American government was struggling to maintain the status quo of a rapidly
disintegrating colonial state.  “Both Grover Cleveland and William McKinley plotted a Cuban policy around
efforts to extract from Madrid reforms designed simultaneously to placate partisan leaders and guarantee
Spanish sovereignty over the island.”[15]  Following the Ten Years War that ended in 1878, the Spanish did
institute one reform with the abolition of slavery, but the promised political reforms negotiated by the United
States did not materialize.  The United States attempted to negotiate a similar settlement in 1897.  The
Spanish agreed, but the PRC, the Cuban military, and the provisional government, filled with the vision of
Cuba Libre, refused.  In April 1898 Maximo Gomez, a liberation army general, adamantly demanded the
eviction of the Spanish.
A year ago we received a proposal to agree to an armistice.  We refused then
and we must refuse now. . . . I am anxious that hostilities should cease, but it
must be for all time.  If Spain agrees to evacuate Cuba, taking her flag with her,
I am willing to agree to an armistice.[16]
 
Throughout 1897 and into 1898, the United States government debated American intervention in
Cuba.  As the impending defeat of the Spanish forces became evident,  U.S. business interests with Cuban
investments and the Cuban elite both asked the United States to intervene and oversee the transition from
Spanish colony to American protectorate.  Both of these groups saw annexation as the ultimate protection. 
Over one hundred planters and industrialists petitioned President Cleveland for assistance as early as June,
1896, claiming that Spain had defaulted on virtually all promises of reform.  The petitioners were equally
concerned that the independence movement would prove a larger threat to their investments than the
Spanish.[17]  Secretary of State John Olney was concerned about the sugar industry.  He wrote the Spanish
foreign minister, “ The wholesale destruction of property on the Island is utterly destroying American
investments that should be of immense value.”[18]  As the American public urged humanitarian intervention,
openly opposed annexation, and supported Cuban independence, their government expressed serious doubts
about whether the Cubans could either win the war or effectively govern themselves.  A paternalistic view of
the Cuban people drove the intervention engine and barely masked the economic self-interest of American
officials and business. 
            J.C. Breckinridge, U.S. Undersecretary of State, expressed his concerns about the Cuban people in a
memorandum to the Commander of the U.S. Army in December, 1897:
The inhabitants are generally indolent and apathetic.  As for their learning they range from the most
refined to the most vulgar and abject.  Its people are indifferent to religion, and the majority are
therefore immoral and simultaneously they have strong passions and are very sensual.  Since they
only possess a vague notion of what is right and wrong, the people tend to seek pleasure not through
work, but through violence . . . we must clean up this country, even if this means using the methods
Divine Providence used on the cities of Sodom and Gomorrah.[19]
The Cuban military, poised for a final victory after thirty years of conflict, warned the United States
that intervention was neither necessary or desired.  Marti had sounded the alarm in 1895 over replacing
Spanish with American hegemony.  “Once the United States is in Cuba, who will get it out?”[20]  General
Antonio Maceo insisted the Cuban military did not need American help. “We shall not ask for interference by
the United States, we don’t need that.  We can end this war ourselves before the year is out.”[21]  The Cuban
legal counsel in Washington, D.C., Horatio S. Rubens, told the White House directly, “We will oppose any
intervention which does not have for its expressed and declared object the independence of Cuba.”[22] 
Rubens was particularly concerned that the United States had continued to withhold recognition of the
independence movement and he warned McKinley:
We must and will regard such intervention as nothing less than a declaration of war by the United
States against the Cuban revolutionists.  If intervention shall take place on that basis, and the United
States shall land an armed force on Cuban soil, we shall treat that force as an enemy to be opposed,
and, if possible, expelled.[23]
 
On April 9, 1898, President McKinley asked for congressional permission to pacify the island of
Cuba, and made no mention of independence or the recognition of belligerents.  He called for a neutral
intervention to stop the fighting and establish a stable government.  The Joint Resolution of April 20
authorized military force, but in response to Ruben’s concerns, included the Teller Amendment, disclaiming
any American intention to exercise sovereignty over the island beyond pacification. 
Tomas Estrada Palma had replaced Jose Marti as leader of Cuba’s provisional government.  He was a
naturalized American citizen, educated in the United States, and contrary to the military leaderships’
independence stance, had moved the PRC toward an annexationist position. During the conflict, he resided in
Washington D.C.  He accepted the premise of the Teller Amendment and, without the official backing of the
Cuban Army or the PRC representatives in Cuba, placed the Cuban army under the authority of the invading
United States Army.[24]  The Cuban provisional government reluctantly accepted Palma’s decision and
prepared to coordinate with the American forces.
On April 21, 1898, the United States declared war on Spain and invaded Cuba with no clearly stated
purpose beyond ending the hostilities. In 1898, when Senator George Hoar exhorted the U.S. Congress to
support American intervention in the bloody conflict that had been raging for three long years between Cuba
and Spain, he summarized the national purpose felt by many Americans:
It will lead to the most honorable single war in history. . . . It is a war in which there does not enter the
slightest thought or desire of foreign conquest, or of national gain, or advantage. . . . It is entered into
for the single purpose that three or four hundred thousand human beings within ninety miles of our
shores have been subjected to the policy intended to starve them to death.[25]
Humanitarianism was but one small explanation for the intervention.  Senator Thurston of Nebraska saw the
war as good for business.  “War with Spain would increase the business and the earnings of every American
railroad, increase the output of every American factory, stimulate every branch of industry and domestic
commerce.”[26]  Senator Money of Mississippi thought war was good for the soul.  “War brings out all the
best traits of  character…devotion, self-abnegation, courage.”[27]  Many American politicians wanted
revenge for the sinking of the U.S.S. Maine in February of 1898.  National stature and an aggressive foreign
policy were the concerns of Assistant Secretary of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt when he wrote, “I should
myself like to shape our foreign policy with a purpose ultimately of driving off this continent every European
power.”[28]  The yellow journalism of American newspapers stoked the fires of the national movement to
avenge the Spanish atrocities against the Cubans and expel the bloodthirsty and vicious Spanish from the
island.  William Randolph Hearst bragged that he had spent a million dollars to bring about war.[29] 
President Grover Cleveland had made the case in 1896 that the key issue was to keep Cuba out of the hands
of any other power.  Others were moved by the quest for new markets, a wish to protect American
investments, or the desire to secure the shipping lanes in the Caribbean and provide naval bases to protect the
future canal across Panama.
The Americans had not arrived as allies of the Cubans or as agents of Cuban independence.  North
American commanders moved quickly to exclude the Cuban military from the front lines, subdued the
weakened Spanish forces, and instituted a military protectorate, giving virtually no recognition to the Cuban
army or the provisional government.  “Cuban commanders were ignored.  Negotiations for the surrender of
Santiago de Cuba[30] were conducted without Cuban participation, and by the terms of the surrender Cubans
were barred from entering the city.”[31]  The scene was repeated across the island as American troops
relegated the Cubans to the rear lines, robbing them of the victory and closure for which they had struggled
for more than thirty years. 
American paternalism toward the Cuban people showed in the descriptions of their military.  The
conflict itself, ignoring the three Cuban insurrections over thirty bloody years, was dubbed the Spanish-
American War, as if the Cubans had not participated in the outcome.  Although the Cubans were generally
excluded from battle, United States’ reports bristled with tales of Cuban cowardice and inefficiency.  General
H.S. Lawton proclaimed that “The Cuban soldier is a myth.”[32] Another American officer said, “The rebels
were a lot of degenerates, absolutely devoid of honor or gratitude, no more capable of self-government than
the savages of Africa.”[33]  The New York Times reported on July 29, “The Cubans who have made a
pretense at fighting with us have proved worthless in the field . . . it would be a tragedy, a crime to deliver the
island into their hands.”[34]  A correspondent for the New York Times insisted “There is no Cuba. There is no
Cuban people; no Cuban aspiration; no Cuban sentiment.  I ask where is the Cuban nation?”[35]  Such
demeaning attitudes led American officials to the obvious conclusion: the imposition of a government by the
Americans was the only way to save the future independence of the Cubans.  Major George Barber, an
American official in the newly conquered city of Santiago de Cuba, insisted that “The Cubans are utterly
irresponsible and have no idea what good government is.  Under our supervision and with firm and honest
care for the future, the people of Cuba may become a useful ace.”[36]  Governor-General John R. Brooke
agreed: “These people cannot now or in the immediate future be entrusted with their own government.”[37]
Both American officials and the American public viewed their military’s efforts as courageous,
generous, and worthy of the subservient gratitude of the Cubans.  They were distressed at the response they
received from the Cuban military and the provisional government, each of whom realized their opportunity
for a free and independent Cuba was evaporating.  An editorial in the Washington Post in early 1900
concluded, 
After our country, out of pure sympathy, has spent millions upon millions and sacrificed many of her
noble sons upon the altar of humanity to rescue the Gem of the Antilles from Spanish greed and
oppression, we are now called upon to give up all and retire from the field of action . . . the amazing
impudence to demand immediate independence is unparalleled in history.  We are dealing with base
men, devoid of magnanimity.[38]
The Americans conducted peace negotiations and concluded the Treaty of Paris with the Spanish in
August of 1898.  No Cuban participation was permitted.  General Maximo Gomez expressed the
disappointment of the Cuban patriots.  “None of us thought that the American intervention would be followed
by a military occupation of our country by our allies, who treat us as a people incapable of acting for
ourselves. . . . This cannot be our ultimate fate after years of struggle.[39]
By assuming the credit for ousting the Spanish and securing the peace, the United States appropriated
the right to supervise the Cuban government.  They were distrustful of the independistas, the ignorant masses
and ungrateful rabble, whom they viewed as too stupid to realize they were not ready to govern themselves.
“The Cuban desire for independence was motivated by a wish to plunder and exact revenge.  If we are to save
Cuba we must hold it.  If we leave it to the Cubans we give it over to a reign of terror.”[40] Thus the war of
liberation became a war of conquest, and the Teller Amendment an empty promise.
The United States occupation of Cuba from 1898 until 1902 secured the island as a neo-colonial
possession through political coercion, cultural domination, and financial investment.  Jose Marti’s vision of a
new, democratic, diverse and egalitarian republic fell victim to the protectorate.  The Americans viewed
Marti’s goals as far more threatening to U.S. economic and strategic interests than Spanish sovereignty.  In
order to secure control of the country, the occupation forces needed to oversee the disbanding of the Cuban
army and arrange for a Cuban congress friendly to American aims. 
When the army, filled with the most radical independistas, began to understand that the Teller
Amendment would not be honored, they considered declaring war on the United States, but General Gomez
realized that this was impossible as his army was starving, homeless and decimated from years of war. 
Without the approval of the provisional government, he accepted three million dollars to pay off his soldiers
in exchange for an American guarantee to honor its commitment.  In doing so, Gomez put the independence
of Cuba in the hands of the Americans.  As the army disbanded, the PRC and the National Assembly, the last
bastions of the independence movement, disintegrated.[41] The American military government proceeded to
reshape the Cuban colony with little resistance.
The first order of business for the Americans was to secure the political structure of the protectorate,
and thereby ensure that the proper Cubans were in place to create a constitution, and later a republic, which
reflected American interests.  The Americans established close relationships with Tomas Estrada Palma and
other pro-annexation Cubans, primarily white, propertied, educated, and returned exiles.  These members of
the elite were dedicated, as were the Americans, to preventing the social and economic reshaping of Cuba as
proposed by Marti and the independistas.  They were appointed to key positions as municipal and civic
officers.  To ensure that the electorate reflected the “better classes” and were denied the considerable power
of independista sentiment, Secretary of War Elihu Root “proposed limited suffrage, one that would exclude
the mass of ignorant and incompetent” voters.[42]  All voters were required to be adult males in possession
of real property, possess an ability to read and write, or be a veteran of military service. 
The 1900 municipal elections demonstrated the lack of public support for the occupation.  Each of the
American backed candidates was defeated, despite the voting restrictions.  The newly elected independistas
immediately stepped up demands that the United States evacuate the island.  During the next crucial round of
elections to select a constituent assembly, U.S. Military Governor General Leonard Wood hand picked the
conservative candidates, campaigned for them, and reminded the Cuban public that “no constitution which
does not provide for a stable government will be accepted by the United States.”[43]  Again, the American
backed conservatives were trounced.  Wood reported to Senator Orville Platt that “the men whom I had
hoped to see take leadership have been forced into the background by the absolutely irresponsible and
unreliable element.”[44]  The Constitutional Convention convened in July 1900. The outspoken support for
independence demonstrated to American officials the Cuban’s incapacity for self-government.  In March
1901 the United States Congress solved their dilemma by passing the Platt Amendment, a series of rules
limiting future Cuban rights and expanding American powers over the Cuban government.  The Congress
demanded that the amendment be written into the Cuban Constitution, without which action the military
occupation would not end.  The Platt Amendment limited Cuba’s right to negotiate treaties, extended the right
of intervention to the United States at its discretion, legalized all acts taken under the American occupation,
removed the Isle of Pines from Cuban jurisdiction, and required the provision of land for American naval
bases and fueling stations. Despite widespread protests, the message to the convention was clear.  Accept
limited sovereignty or no sovereignty.  The Constitution, including the Platt Amendment, passed sixteen to
eleven.[45]  The dream of a truly independent Cuba was gone. 
The cultural and economic domination of the American occupation was less direct than the Platt
Amendment, but no less devastating to the majority of the Cuban people. Under American supervision, Cuba
lost the opportunity to rebuild a diverse economy or an egalitarian society.  The American intervention had
stopped the revolution short of its goals of agrarian reform, anti-imperialism, racial equality, and social
justice, and solidified a colonial hierarchy under American influence.  Thirty years of warfare left the island
destroyed, and the intervention assured that the reconstruction of the Cuban economy would be based on the
cash cropping of sugar rather than a more diverse and self-sufficient system. “Americans recognized that
hegemonial relations with Cuba depended upon reconstructing the sugar system.  The restoration of sugar
production promised to restore the propertied classes to positions of privilege-the very elites from which
Americans were seeking to recruit allies”[46]  The occupation government utilized its considerable financial
leverage to facilitate the investment of American capital and the consolidation of the sugar industry.  General
Leonard Wood advised President McKinley that after having successfully blocked Cuban independence, the
remaining chore was to solidify economic ties.  “There is, of course, no independence left in Cuba after the
Platt Amendment. . . . With the control we now have over Cuba, combined with the other sugar producing
lands we now own, we shall soon practically control the sugar trade of the world,”[47]
The neo-colonial system established during the occupation encouraged investment.  American
corporations and land speculators purchased thousands of acres of land from indebted Cuban farmers.  Within
a few years of the intervention, American capital had gained control of the sugar, mining, real estate,
construction, utilities and tobacco industries.  Changes in the land title system initiated by the occupation
forces displaced many Cuban families unable to prove ownership.  These lands were auctioned at very low
prices to the American land investors and corporations.[48]  As noted in the Louisiana Planter in 1903,
“Little by little the whole island is passing into the hands of American citizens.”[49]  For the Cuban working
class the transition from colony meant destitution.  Displaced from vanishing agrarian jobs and pressured by
massive post-war immigration,[50] thousands fell into poverty.
Just two years later, as American troops invaded Cuba, the issue of race also confronted the
occupation government.  The racial equality that proved so elusive in North America,[51] had been a
principle tenet of “Cuba Libre” and a reality in the Cuban armed forces.  American officers were shocked to
not only find blacks in positions of power, but also accepted as an integral part of the Cuban military.  The
occupation forces were not inclined to allow such “an experiment in interracial democracy” to continue.
Order was far more important than inclusiveness to the Americans, and depended on promoting the “right
people” to local positions.[52] 
The occupation forces reversed the broad vision of Cuban citizenship.  The reorganization of the
Cuban Army systematically denied commissions to Afro-Cubans.  Quentin Bandera was a black Cuban who
had been fighting the Spanish since 1850.  He rose in the Cuban military to the rank of general and had a
sterling national reputation.  In 1898, after sitting out the final battles with the rest of the Cuban forces, he
was denied full payment for his military service and refused a commission in the reconstituted Cuban Army. 
He was rumored to have held a job in Havana as a garbage collector until he was murdered in 1906.  For the
Afro-Cubans, the intervention and occupation ended their hopeful dream of equal opportunity in a new
inclusive Cuba, and a return, if not to slavery, to a subservient role based on North American racial values. 
The occupation did result in American investments that provided great economic advances for a
decimated Cuba. General Wood oversaw the repair and construction of infrastructure such as sanitation
systems, roads and bridges, hospitals, harbors, and communication systems.  Although some construction
was designed to promote American investment, many of the public works projects benefiting the destitute
Cuban people could not have occurred without serious financial aid from abroad.  General Wood oversaw the
National Library project as well as the medical research that identified the vector of yellow fever.  The
appalling condition of the nation’s prisons and mental hospitals was also addressed.  The justice system was
revamped, habeas corpus introduced, and the corrupt judicial system rebuilt.[53]  None of these actions
however included the participation of Cuban leaders.
Nowhere did the Americans attempt to have a greater impact on Cuban life than in the area of
education.  As in other colonial efforts, the Cubans were not consulted.  General Wood “sought no less than a
cultural revolution, a total reconstruction of society, with education as the main tool. . . . Once educated, they
would recognize the superiority of American over Spanish values and patterns of behavior, and would
perform as sober and responsible people.”[54]  The most important facet of the program involved the
building of schools.  Although the Spanish colonial government had a strong secondary and university
program, primary schooling was abysmal, a clear reflection of a class society.  
Wood’s plan was based on the Ohio school system and included instruction in English, subject matter
translated from American textbooks, and teachers imported from the states or trained there.  He experienced
impressive initial successes.  Enrollments jumped five times in the first year, and literacy rose from 41 to 57
percent.[55]  The success did not last.  American unwillingness to consider cultural differences presented
several long-term problems.  Teacher selection followed the same path as political appointments.  A
patronage system resulted in widespread corruption and nepotism on local boards.  The American emphasis
on industrial and competitive methods reinforced the aristocratic social system.  Hastily conceived
certification plans led to a lack of professionalism.  The military authorities gave control of the schools to
local boards, but did not provide for local community control of the boards.  The teacher corps did not reflect
the diversity of the country.  Lincoln De Zayas, a secretary of public instruction years after the occupation,
offered that Cuba was simply not ready for an American system.[56]  In later years the early successes could
not be sustained.  Enrollments fell, students in lower grades did not advance, and the widening gap in wealth
on the island was reflected in the 85 percent of wealthy Cubans who sent their children to private
schools.[57]  Efforts to democratize the Cuban schools through an American system failed.  In 1902, 45
percent
of Cuban children were enrolled in primary school.  By 1955 that figure had risen to just 55 percent.[58]  In
each instance, the American attempt to control or reshape Cuban culture did not succeed.  Military force
subdued the independence movement but could not kill it.
The American military occupation of Cuba ended on May 20, 1902.  The dichotomy between true
independence and the provisions of the Platt Amendment, the growing economic domination of the United
States, and an artificially constructed political hierarchy all failed to disguise the neo-colonial reality which
would become twentieth century Cuba. Another intervention and another occupation would take place just
three years after American forces left Cuba.  “Cuba Libre” was both subdued and kept alive by the Platt
Amendment. Enrique Collazo insisted that the defeat of Spain had been a Cuban victory, stolen by the United
States for the sole purpose of depriving the island of its sovereignty.[59]  General Gomez added, “There is so
much natural anger and grief throughout the island that the people haven’t really been able to celebrate the
triumph.”[60]  The American subjugation of Cuban independence and the trail of broken promises acted
much like a grain of sand in an oyster.  The unfinished revolution of 1895 – 1898 shaped the republic and
Cuban politics for the next sixty years. 
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Some day a man with stouter muscle and better wind, though no stouter heart than
many who went before, will lick Mt. Everest, and before coming down its 10 to 1 he
will leave a memento of Maywood, Illinois, 29,000 feet up in the air.  Before the
explorer turns from conquest to fight a way back . . . he will toss away the empty
container, and there will be Maywood's coat of arms, a tin can couchant on the roof of
the world.[1]
So wrote a Chicago Times writer, penning a profile of Maywood in 1938.  Three miles west of
Chicago’s border, Maywood--a suburb of 25,000 in 1930--was home to a large factory operated by the
American Can Company. A number of smaller institutions were also located in Maywood, among them a
Lutheran Seminary, a Baptist Old People's Home, and an orphanage.  Hines Veteran Hospital was located just
south of the village, and Canada Dry (beverages) also had a factory in Maywood.  Unlike many suburbs,
Maywood also had a small African-American community--roughly 3% of the population in 1930.[2]   This
suburb thus offers an opportunity to examine how a relatively diverse suburb (both racially and
economically) responded to the challenges of the Depression.  Examination of this suburb tells two stories. 
One is of local leaders and civic and community organizations who struggled to do their very best to aid the
needy during both the Hoover and Roosevelt years.  The second story tells how difficult it could be to fund
relief, which gave rise to some class conflict.
Maywood had its beginning in 1869, when Colonel William T. Nichols received a charter for a joint
stock corporation called the Maywood Company. In 1900, Maywood's population was 4,532.  This increased
to 8,033 in 1910, and 12,072 lived in Maywood by 1920.  Like much of the Chicagoland area, the 1920's
were years of tremendous growth for the town, and the 1930 census revealed a population of 25,829.  Sixty
years later, the town's population was 27,139, so it is safe to say that the town was fairly well built up on the
eve of the Depression.[3]
A study of the 1929-30 Maywood City Directory shows that the residents worked in a variety of jobs,
though most could be described as "skilled" tradespeople.  The fifteen most common occupations culled from
753 names listed under three letters of the alphabet were:[4]
Chauffeur  (22)                         Worker in "big factory"  (17)
Carpenter  (15)                                    Manager/Foreman  (23)
Clerical  (57)                                        Mechanic  (24)
Grocer  (13)                                         Machinist  (10)
Salesperson (34)                                  Railroad Worker (13)  
Laborer  (31)                                       Contractor (12)
Student (20)                                         Teacher (12)
Secretary/Stenographer  (21).
 
There were also several listings for employees of the following large factories—Western Electric, Illinois
Bell, and American Can.
A study of the figures from the 1940 Census (table 1) reveals that Maywood was a mixed suburb
economically.  If one defines "middle-class" as those who labored in the first four categories of the table
(professional, semi-professional, managers/proprietors/officials, and clerical/sales), and "working class" as
those in six of the next seven (crafts/foreman, laborers, operatives, service workers, those on Public
Emergency Work, and domestic service employees).  Note that 46.2% of Maywood's residents could be
defined "middle-class" and an equal percentage (again 46.2%) may be defined "working-class."  It may be
argued that "professional" should be placed in "upper-class."  (The author did not find any data about income
levels of Maywood or any other local communities)  Yet these figures do provide evidence that Maywood
was essentially a mixed suburb occupationally, and therefore economically as well.
Maywood was the largest town in Proviso Township, which also included the towns of Forest Park,
Broadview, Hillside, Westchester, Bellwood, and Melrose Park.  There were two theaters in town--the Yale
and the Lido.  The town had five elementary schools, and Proviso High School (located in Maywood) had
over 3,000 students, making it one of the largest non-city high schools in the state.  There were over twenty
churches in town and also a synagogue.  Maywood may not have had the reputation of being wealthy as did
nearby Oak Park or Elmhurst, but it was a comfortable suburb.  Indeed, the planning done by Colonel
Nichols in the 1870s still gave the town something of an "elite" reputation fifty years later.[5]
Maywood During the Hoover Years
The Great Depression came early to Maywood.  The town was adversely affected by the building
slump of 1929.  In 1928, the building total for Maywood was $255,550.  A year later it was only $19,889.[6]
A group of businessmen, meeting the week before the stock market crashed, spoke of the "present
downturn."[7]   That winter, an employee at a health center in Maywood noticed that poverty was much
greater in the town than it had been in previous winters.[8]  The village grappled with financial problems
even before the Crash.  In the spring of 1929, the town was more than $100,000 in debt.[9]   The high school
was also having difficulties paying its teachers.[10]
The increasing number of bank failures around the country included Maywood's three banks, in
addition to those in nearby communities.  The People's State Bank closed on February 8, 1930.[11]  The next
year, the Forest Park Trust and Savings suspended operations on December 16, the Proviso State Bank closed
on December 17, and the Maywood State Bank and the Melrose Park State Bank closed on December
18.[12]  The closing of so many banks so close together made life very difficult for the townspeople.   Hugh
Muir was an automobile painter who had both his checking account and his mortgage at the Maywood State
Bank.  He thought he could at least have some of his checking account applied to his mortgage, but when he
went to the receiver's office, he learned the Bank (before it had closed) had sold his mortgage to another
company, so he lost money left in his check account and no relief on his mortgage payment.[13]   The
community struggled to remain upbeat during these difficult days.  Seven years later the Herald recalled what
it was like.  Writing about a local church, it reported, "As with so many congregations, business houses, and
individuals, notes could not be met, there was default on interest, and the mortgage was due, while with
members losing their homes and positions and suffering cuts in salary."[14]  The phrase "As with so many"
suggests that a far greater number than ordinary were going through difficult, challenging circumstances. 
One creative way the town responded to the bank closings was through the establishment of the
clearinghouse.  This was an institution established by some village businessmen, many of whom belonged to
the Lions Club.  Patterned after clearinghouses in operation in Des Plaines and Melrose Park, it opened in
early 1933.  Depositors in a bank, anticipating a 5% dividend, could buy necessities from local merchants,
who would then be paid by the bank receiver when the dividend was due.  The clearinghouse ran for about
four years.   Hugh Muir recalls that some merchants preferred to barter with each other.[15]
As the Depression worsened, the community expanded its charitable operations.  Prior to the
Depression, the Maywood Public Welfare Organization (which had been formed in 1919) sought to aid the
needy in town.   In 1929, the Maywood Central Relief Committee was formed as an auxiliary of the Public
Welfare Organization.  It was particularly active in the winters of 1930-31 and 1931-32.  The committee
divided the town into 12 (some accounts say 42) sections.[16] Each section had a man and a woman in charge
to investigate cases that were called to the attention of the committee.  The office was open six days a week--
weekdays from 8 to 5, and Saturdays from 8 to 1. During the winter of 1930-31, the committee spent
$8,652.50 to meet the needs of 111 families.[17]
The Relief Committee also helped form (with help from members of the Lions and the Rotary Clubs)
the Community Garden, which operated for several summers in the 1930s.  One summer, 169 unemployed
residents of Maywood cultivated a 69-acre community garden that bordered River and North Avenues. 
Those who gardened, chopped wood in the winter to buy seeds, and a farmer who farmed next to the garden
donated equipment.  Students in Proviso High's domestic science classes canned the surplus, which were
stored at the Relief Committee offices.[18]
These strong and wonderful examples of combating need were conducted in increasingly difficult
times.   A candid and depressing article in the December 24, 1930 Herald entitled "Reasons for Relief" (with
the subtitle "Investigator Finds Many Cases of Want in Visits to Local Homes") stated:
Old man Christmas in Maywood next Thursday is going to have a heart filled with
more sympathy and cheer than he ever had before.  Because after he leaves his good
will in the homes of Maywood's happy, prosperous families, he will turn to those many
sad homes where unemployed fathers and mothers are struggling to keep their boys
and girls from starvation and cold.[19]
 
The article described the circumstances of some of those in need.  During the winter of 1931-32, the Central
Relief Committee was helping 283 families -- more than twice the number they aided the previous winter --
and was having increasing difficulty securing adequate funding.  In fact, the distribution of relief in
Maywood was taken over by the Cook County Welfare Bureau on May 1, 1932.[20] 
In these tough times, people did their very best to keep their spirits up.  Some actually attributed the
harsh economic climate to psychological problems.  A speaker at a Lions Club meeting blamed the
depression on a mental state.[21] Another speaker, talking to the Maywood Real Estate Board, opined, "the
trouble with 1930 was that we all thought this was going to happen and it did. . . . [W]e don't have to fear the
Reds of Russia half as much as the Blues of America."[22]  Advertisements in the Herald urged residents to
put money in circulation.[23]
Yet exhortations to think constructively and to spend money were difficult if not impossible for those
directly touched by the Depression.  One "working class homeowner" vented his frustrations in a letter to the
Herald:
How can we buy normally when about ten percent of the working class gets no salary
at all and twenty percent get only part of their normal wages for they are working only
a few hours per week. I'll tell you my own experience for example.  The early part of
last year I was out of work for seven months.  When I did finally get work I had to
work for half of my former wages.  I had a large mortgage to keep paying on my home,
and payments had to be made.  The taxes came.  They were thirty percent higher.  Of
improvements there couldn't even be a thought.  After I started working I started
saving every cent so as to pay my taxes, not even giving myself the pleasure of a show
and when I finally had enough in the bank for my taxes what happens.  They close the
bank.[24]
The letter illustrates the spiral in which so many people were caught.  With no work or only temporary
employment, they first used up their savings and then risked losing their homes.  They could not pump
money into the economy.  Thus, while the leaders of Maywood stayed upbeat and strove to take care of their
own, it was becoming increasingly difficult to do so. 
What was happening in Maywood, then, was that traditional strategies for hard times were being
challenged.  People believed in saving for hard times, but the banks were closing.  People believed in charity,
but the local organizations were swamped.  Community leaders strove to keep morale up, but the town had
never--with the possible exception of the Depression of the late 1870s--known such difficult times.
Maywood and the New Deal
With no banks and overburdened local welfare agencies, Maywood welcomed the New Deal.  The
bank moratorium did not really affect the town, as residents had more or less accustomed themselves to
closed banks.  The town enthusiastically supported the National Recovery Act (NRA), however.  A local
doctor--Charles Wiley--was named the "General" of Maywood's NRA campaign.  He selected three
"Colonels" to aid him in administering the program.  Colonel #1 was to conduct a block by block census to
see how many people were unemployed.  Colonel #2 was in charge of publicity.  Colonel #3 was to organize
and direct a speaker's bureau.  On 1 August 1933, twenty-six businessmen went to a local NRA conference in
Champaign.  (Interestingly, Maywood accepted the conservative aspects of the NRA, such as military
organization and local control.)  In early September, one of Maywood's sister cities (Melrose Park) bragged
that it was the first village in the United States to attain 100% compliance (businesses and residences) with
the goals of the NRA.[25]
The next New Deal program to directly affect the town was the Civil Works Administration
(CWA—the emergency jobs program established in the fall of 1933 by the Roosevelt Administration), which
would leave a lasting legacy in Maywood in the form of the football stadium at Proviso High School. 
Registration for CWA jobs began on November 20; one hundred men appeared in the office that morning. 
One of the first projects approved was the stadium.  However, the stadium was not finished when the CWA
shut down in early 1934.  It was considered worthwhile enough to be completed, however, and continued
under the auspices of the Illinois Emergency Relief Commission.  The stadium was finished later in 1934. 
Standing tall for more than six decades, it has been the home of many exciting football games and track
meets.[26]
The township planned a celebration after the stadium was completed.  A football game was arranged
between the Maywood Athletic Club and the Chicago Cardinals of the National Football League.  A large
parade--which wound its way through all seven towns of Proviso Township--preceded the game.  Dr. Preston
Bradley of the People's Church of Chicago gave a speech, in which he heralded the completion of the stadium
as a sterling example of cooperation between local, state, and federal governments.  All of this enthusiasm
did not help the Maywood team, however, as the Cardinals won 43-0.[27]
Another popular New Deal program with lasting effects was the night school.  Before the Depression,
about 35% of Proviso High's graduates went to college.[28]  The Depression made it harder for young people
to stay in school.  In late 1933, the Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA) announced that a night
school would begin at Proviso.  Fourteen teachers, one librarian, and two clerical workers were hired to staff
the school.  The teachers, who were paid $100 per month, taught twenty-one different subjects.  More than a
thousand students enrolled in the program.[29]
These projects were enthusiastically publicized.  Inevitably, however, there were problems.  Workers
complained about rude case workers and delayed payments.  A group of them met with State Senator Arthur
A. Huebesch.  Soon some workers formed their own organization--the Proviso Workers Brotherhood.  The
Brotherhood was made up at first of CWA workers only, but later was open to anyone who wished to
join.[30]    A similar organization--the Proviso Workers Association--met frequently at a local Methodist
church.  The Association had forums on such topics as "Minimum Wage Laws" and "Red Cross Activities." 
They presented a play called "Take My Advice,” about a worker named Bob.  Bob throws off the yoke of
John Wargrim, the powerful boss of the town of "Eureka."[31] After these exciting developments, mention of
workers' organizations disappeared from the Herald for two years.
These groups (the Workers Brotherhood and the Workers Association) were mostly lobbying bodies
for the workers.  That they appeared intermittently and lacked strong leadership indicates they were not intent
on class struggle or even that they were necessarily disgruntled with the New Deal.  Rather, they wanted
respect, decent pay and better transportation to their jobs.  The Association also helped workers find jobs. 
Workers in Maywood and Proviso Township may not have liked their bosses in the 1930s, but may also have
dreamed that they or their children may one day be the bosses.
The Works Progress Association (WPA) gave Maywood a chance to complete some public works
projects that were badly needed.  One--repairing the storm sewers--had been considered in the 20s but had
been deemed too expensive.  Work commenced on the storm sewers in November 1935.  The project called
for the construction of 480 manholes and the installation of 17,000 lineal feet of concrete pipe ranging from 8
feet to 5 inches in circumference.  The project lasted for almost a year and provided work for more than a
thousand men.[32]
The WPA Recreation projects also provided a useful service.  Classes were held in barn dancing, first
aid, tap dancing, golf, badminton, chess and checkers.  There was also a men's volleyball league and a
women's cycling club.  Wrestling events were held at the National Guard Armory on Roosevelt Road.  The
WPA also sponsored an ice derby.[33]  The National Youth Administration (NYA) helped many students stay
in school.  Sixty-nine students held jobs at Proviso High in 1935.[34]
That the New Deal touched Maywood's citizens in a positive way can be seen by studying election
results.  In 1928, Maywood preferred Herbert Hoover to Al Smith, 7,557 to 3,189.[35] In the 1936 elections,
Maywood still preferred the Republican candidate, Alf Landon, over President Roosevelt.  However, the vote
was much closer, with 5,082 for Landon and 4,884 for Roosevelt.[36]  (The township, however, supported
Roosevelt 15,825 to 13,623.  Maywood's sister city, Melrose Park, with a heavy Italian-American
working-class population, tended to vote Democratic.)  Four years later, the ratio was similar to the 1928
election, with Maywood's voters preferring the Republican Wendell Wilkie over Roosevelt 8,195 to
5,228.[37]  The closer 1936 vote shows that many Maywoodians were grateful for the efforts of the New
Deal.
 Yet while the 1936 vote shows a substantial shift to Roosevelt, it is still instructive that a majority of
the town's residents voted against him.  Thus, while need was still evident in 1936, and though the town had
co-operated and backed several New Deal projects such as the football stadium, many in the community were
not entirely supportive of the New Deal.  This is evident by studying the township relief crisis of 1936-37. 
Indeed, the fight to pass a required property tax increase in the township would reveal significant class
conflict.
The Relief Crisis of 1936-37
Although several New Deal programs were a visible force in Maywood, it is important to realize that
by 1935 (even though it was the time of the "Second New Deal"), not all relief money was coming from the
federal government.  Indeed, although Illinois was one of the first states to receive FERA money in 1933, in
1935 Harry Hopkins refused Illinois any more aid.  (Hopkins insisted that Illinois contribute $3 million a
month to receive the federal allotment of $9 million per month.)[38]  This meant that state and local
governments had to once again fund relief.  In this difficult climate, Governor Henry Horner pushed a very
unpopular sales tax through the legislature.[39]  This tax would be split among the states' townships, but in
1936 the townships were also required to pass a real estate levy (which would raise taxes $0.30 per $100
assessed property value) in order to qualify for the relief funds.  In Proviso Township, the struggle to pass this
levy would become an eight-month ordeal.  In addition to revealing class conflict, the crisis shows how
challenging it was for local governments to come up with relief money during the depression.
When the levy was first introduced at a township meeting--open to all registered voters--in July 1936,
it was voted down by a margin of 10-1.  At the time, Proviso Township had 696 families on relief.[40]   The
township was thus not eligible for state money, the leaders of the seven towns (along with school board
leaders) of the township traveled to Springfield to plead for clemency from Gov. Horner.  The governor
listened attentively to their plea, but informed them that by law relief was their own responsibility, and that
they would have to find the means to pay for it.[41]
Township leaders thus had no other choice than to call another election.  The levy was voted down
again, at a second election in October.[42] Two factions battled each other for influence during these months. 
On one side were the advocates of relief, organized as the Citizen's Committee on Relief.  Their leader was
Reverend Armand Guerrero, the Pastor of the Community Methodist Church in Forest Park.  Rev. Guerrero
urged the passing of the levy "as a duty to the community."[43] He lent his church as a meeting place for
those on relief, and, in a letter to the Herald, angrily criticized those who voted against the levy.[44]
On the other side were certain property owners, many of whom belonged to the Proviso Township
Taxpayer's Association.  They contended that there was too much waste in the relief system, that the Mothers
Pensions and Blind Pensions were already serving the needy, and that the levy was unfair because it singled
out property owners.  A leader of the Association also insisted that the township deserved its share of the
sales tax, period.  If Proviso received its share, he argued, "there is absolutely no need for a levy on real estate
in Proviso Township."[45] Another property owner contended that just because he owned a house (which he
admitted, he still had because of the HOLC) did not mean he had the means to pay more taxes.  This
homeowner wrote the Herald:
Someone said 'nice people.'  Does that person pay property tax?  The writer doubts it. 
Let us look at the facts.  My home was saved through the HOLC.  We are just able to
meet the present tax bill.  How?  By going without food, clothing, and medical care
and medicine.  Ask any homeowner if this is not a fact.[46]
This letter is similar to the one by the working class homeowner who saved to pay his property taxes, only to
lose his savings when the bank closed.  Residents were being exhorted to spend and pay taxes, but what if
they basically had no money to do so?
As a result of the failed levies, the township had to close its relief office.[47] Private charities had to
pick up the relief effort.  The township supervisor was besieged with requests for the necessities of life.[48]
The American Legion and the Goodfellows had drives for the families on relief, and collected over 2,000
Christmas baskets, and the Community Chest administered relief for the duration of the winter.[49] This was
a far greater amount than had ever been collected, but among 500 needy families, how much would 2,000
baskets provide?  The township leaders admitted as much, and kept pushing for the passing of the levy. 
Finally, on 6 April 1937, they called a township meeting, and the levy passed.  Proviso (and Maywood)
would now be eligible for state money.[50]
The relief crisis demonstrates how hard it was to fund relief during the Depression.  Even though the
New Deal was involving the federal government in people's lives in an unprecedented way (during
peacetime), it is instructive that local governments were still expected to raise money for relief.  Hopkins
required Illinois to raise a certain amount of money before he would release federal funds, and Governor
Horner, in turn, required townships to raise property taxes before he would increase state aid.  As is so often
the case, raising taxes proved unpopular.
Secondly, the relief crisis shows that some class conflict existed in this relatively quiet suburb. 
Homeowners bitterly resented a request that they pay higher taxes to fund relief for those who were even
more destitute than they.  Were these people selfish?  Perhaps some were.  Yet many of them were working
part-time and were strapped themselves.  Also, the tax was only to be paid by property owners, and those
who had to pay it thus saw it as an attack on those who had worked hard to save and buy a house.  In their
eyes, they were the "deserving poor."  Indeed, throughout the state there remained some ill feeling towards
those on relief.  In 1940, Frank Glick--writing the story of the Illinois Emergency Relief Commission--noted
that the Commission had only been formed with great reluctance, and throughout its existence public opinion
was rather antagonistic towards it.[51]
Suffering Differently:  Maywood's African-American Community
One night in 1933, Dr. Charles Wiley--the same Charles Wiley who was the local "General" for the
NRA campaign--went over to the residence of Charles E. Divers in the African-American section of town. 
Charles Divers did janitorial work and one of the offices he cleaned was Dr. Wiley's.  That night Dr. Wiley
delivered the Divers' baby for free.  The parents determined that if the baby was a boy he would be named
Wiley, in honor of Dr. Wiley.  That night Marion Divers delivered a beautiful baby girl, who was named
Consuela (after Consuela Vanderbilt).  Connie Divers' fondest memory of the 1930's would be tap dancing on
the marble floor of the Lido Theater while her mother (who also worked at American Can) worked as a
matron in the ladies room.[52]
Virtually all of Maywood's blacks lived near the railroad tracks in an area that stretched from St.
Charles Road on the north to Madison Street on the south, and from 10th Street on the east to 13th Street on
the west.  Two of Maywood's churches--the Second Baptist Church and Canaan African Methodist Episcopal
(A.M.E.)--were black.  Some African Americans worshipped at the local Episcopal Church, but did not feel
wholly included in the life of the church, and started a mission church, named St. Simon's, for blacks.[53]   In
some ways the town was progressive.  A 1926 article in the Herald, "Give Thought to the Negro," written by
a researcher of the United Charities of Chicago, told of the harsh realities African Americans faced at the
time.[54] The next year the paper published an editorial that was entitled, "We Do Not Live in the South!" 
The editorial criticized a rival newspaper for its coverage of a murder in the black section of Maywood, and
stated:
For a long time past, there have been high class negro residents in this town, who have
given loyalty and love to its institutions.  Statements that have been made are a direct
slander against their name and as such should be resented - not only by the negro race
but by the right-thinking, well-meaning white citizens as well.[55]
In other ways, the town reflected the customs of the times.  During the 1930s only a handful of
photographs of African Americans appeared in the pages of the Maywood Herald.  In each case the picture
featured a photograph of a Proviso High School athletic team, in which an African American participated. 
Also, in 1938, Maywood celebrated its seventieth anniversary.  The town's boosters produced a handsome
booklet about the town's organizations, schools, churches, police and fire departments and governing bodies. 
If one knew nothing else about Maywood, one would assume the town was lily-white.  Not one African
American is in any of the photographs.  Similarly, glancing through the Provi--the Proviso High School
Yearbook--one is struck by seeing virtually no black faces in any of the pictures or the clubs and
organizations sponsored by the school.[56]
The churches performed valuable social service functions for the black community during the
depression.  Rev. Jesse Coleman, Pastor of Second Baptist from 1930-37, was an active leader in the black
community, and served as a liaison to the community as a whole.  He served as one of the directors of
Maywood Central Relief Committee, and one winter manned the office on Mondays.[57]  He also served as
First Vice-President of the Ministerial Association, preached often at a local CCC camp, and served as
chairman of the Proviso Township Emergency Relief Committee for Colored People.  Rev. Coleman
established a free employment agency at the church, which, the Herald reported, helped more than 300
people.  He also established a commission on race relations, and read a five year study on the race problem in
Maywood at an inter-racial meeting at Second Baptist.[58]  Moreover, he co-managed the Community
Garden and lobbied the Forest Preserve for jobs for blacks.[59]
New Deal programs also aided Maywood's African Americans.  An Emergency Night School was
held at Second Baptist, with classes held from 4 to 8:15 p.m.  Mondays through Fridays.[60]  Yet like so
many communities, a substantial amount of help for the needy came from family and friends.  Northica Stone
and Geri Stenson remember neighbors helping each other.[61]  Sidney Hearst recalled a grocer named
Zeinfeld, who "helped a lot of Maywood's people . . . he gave them credit during the Depression."[62]  When
asked at a videotaping of Maywood's senior citizens in 1998 about the depression, he and Bobbie Folkes
replied, "Nobody suffered."[63]
There were few advantages for an African American living in Maywood in the 1930s.  Blacks could
and did participate in the community.  Fleming Tyler was elected Republican committeeman for District 28 of
Proviso Township in 1934, and George Harrison served on the Washington Park Board in the 1920s and
30s.[64]  Washington School had 375 students in 1931, 175 of which were black.  Thirteen African
Americans, representing churches and other race organizations, lobbied the Board of Education to begin
hiring black teachers and staff members.  They got nowhere.[65] At the same time, both Robert Fowlkes and
Josephine Becker remember receiving an excellent education in Maywood.  Fowlkes recalled in 1998, "The
teachers at Washington School were excellent. . . . [T]hey were all white, but the students were white and
black. . . .  [T]hey taught us all well."[66] One white man in the community strove to persuade his fellow
whites not to sell their homes to Jews or blacks, though by then many blacks (and Jews) already owned their
own homes.[67]  The fact is that there was de facto segregation in much of life in the 1930s.  The two races
lived in distinctively different social circles.  Yet it must be said that this held true for Catholics, Protestants,
and Jews as well.[68]
Conclusion
The story of Maywood during the Depression is a story of how an industrious suburb was challenged
by the crisis.  A mixed suburb (of working class and middle class, and--for the time--a rare inter-racial town),
most of Maywood's residents were pursuing the "American way of life" (that is, working and saving with the
goal of doing a little bit better than what they had been raised with) in the 1920s.  Yet the depression hit the
town harder than anything had since the depression of the 1870s did during the town's infancy.  Although the
numbers of people affected were not nearly as high as in Bronzeville, the magnitude of need was
unprecedented in the town's history.  Though local institutions responded as well as they could, there was
substantial want in the town in 1932.
Against this need, the New Deal was both well-received and basically appreciated, at least by many
Maywoodians.  The CWA and the WPA left lasting legacies in the town in the form of the football stadium
and the storm sewers.  They also provided needed jobs to many workers.  Yet questions persisted about the
New Deal.  Workers felt patronized, and many residents (both working-class and middle-class) felt oppressed
by new and higher taxes.  This is best seen during the relief crisis of 1936-37.  The township leaders realized
that the poor levy had to be passed, whether they (and the residents) liked it or not.  Yet many residents felt
they should not or could not pay the tax.  The conflict that ensued shows how difficult it could be to fund
relief during the depression.  During this time, Maywood's small black population was "suffering
differently"--enjoying a better education and some better opportunities than blacks in the city or the
south--but still enduring the life of a second class citizen.
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The rise of the New Left in the early 1960s marked a significant, but turbulent turning point in American
history.  Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) was one of the initial and most successful student groups
during the “New Left Movement.” The “Movement” can be characterized as a youth movement against the
established political system, corporatism, and the Vietnam conflict.  The 1962 SDS “Port Huron Statement”
encouraged students and other youth to become politically active and motivated many “New Left” members. 
Beginning with the Berkeley Free Speech Movement (FSM), however, the New Left began to address
pertinent campus and other student rights issues.  Leaders of the FSM, while radical, insisted that the
movement maintain a rational focus to preserve their integrity and advance their cause.  The FSM, influenced
by civil rights activists, used effective but non-violent civil disobedience tactics to gain support and achieve
objectives.  Its leadership represented the early objectives of the New Left—best described as intellectual
radicalism.  This study examines the chronology of events during the fall of 1964, a period during which the
FSM achieved real success.  Through effective leadership, thoughtful protest tactics, and strong support from
the faculty, the FSM accomplished its goals and inspired several years of campus protest. 
Events at Berkeley—Fall 1964
            The higher education environment across the country was changing during the early to mid-1960s. 
Many of these changes and new developments helped create fertile ground for the radical student politics that
led to the fall demonstrations at Berkeley.  During the Baby Boom era, thousands of new students entered
universities.  Colleges across America faced massive enrollment increases, and many institutional
administrators were ill prepared to handle the student invasion.  Berkeley was no exception.  From
1960-1964, the university experienced a 36 percent enrollment increase from 18,728 students to 25,454
students.[1]  The enrollment surge provided the FSM with a large student body that would prove easily
mobilized when the demonstrations began.  Student radicals also benefited from the growing size of the
graduate student population.  Graduate students accounted for only 15 percent of the campus in 1940, but by
1964, they represented more than 30 percent of the student body.[2]  The graduate students not only served as
the vanguard “intellectual radicals” of the FSM, but also were key players during negotiations with the
administration.  Many of the liberal graduate students educated themselves in radical politics and
revolutionary action.  The graduate students involved in the FSM idolized third world revolutionaries like
Mao Zedong and Che Guevara and were familiar with Marxism.
 Additionally, many of the graduate students were studying disciplines in the liberal arts and
humanities.  Generally speaking, the courses and faculty involved in such disciplines were more politically
oriented than their science and mathematics counterparts.  Undergraduates as well, generally shifted from
studying science and mathematics and moved toward more liberal curriculum like history, philosophy, and
sociology.[3]  Faculty in these programs promoted free thought and encouraged students to critically analyze
world events.  Gradually, the mood at Berkeley grew more progressive, and by 1964 the university was
considered one of the most liberal institutions in America.
            The extent of Berkeley activism became clear when the fall semester commenced in 1964. 
Radicalism grew as students entered the semester educated about activist politics and civil rights.  Several
hundred students spent the summer months before the fall semester participating in Freedom Summer. 
Northern white students, including sixty from UC Berkeley, participated in civil rights projects in
Mississippi, Alabama, and North Carolina.[4]  The students engaged in Freedom Summer worked with
African-American student organizations like the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC),
learning the basic methods of protest and civil disobedience.  When Berkeley students returned to campus in
September, they created and joined new organizations that addressed civil rights students’ rights, and
contemporary American politics.  The Berkeley chapter of SDS grew exponentially in size, while SNCC the
established the first Berkeley chapter that fall.[5]  Furthermore, the national election was only two months
away, so students were eager and the campus was alive with political campaigns and demonstrations.  Many,
but not all of the demonstrations were leftist in nature, which disturbed conservative California politicians
and Berkeley alumni.  Political literature denounced Barry Goldwater’s campaign for president.  Other
pamphlets and campaigns advocated civil rights and the abolition of Jim Crow laws.
            In response to the growing student activism, Alex Sheriffs, the Berkeley vice-chancellor for student
affairs, suggested that President Clark Kerr ban all campus political activity.[6]  Student political activity was
already limited to a 26’x 90’ area on the corner of Bancroft and Telegraph, which was directly outside the
main university entrance, known as Sather Gate.  Kerr, although a self-professed liberal, had a strict
philosophy concerning on-campus political activity.[7]  At the University of California Charter Day in 1964,
Kerr’s stated that philosophy.  “Just like the University should not invade students’ off-campus life…so also
the students, individually or collectively, should not and cannot take the name of the University
into…political or other non-University facilities,” opined the president.[8]  Kerr saw student activism as a
distraction and in direct conflict with his grander idea of higher education and the university master plan. 
When he became President in 1958,  Kerr’s master plan envisioned the university, in his master plan, as an
institution above the typical political fray.  According to his agenda, the University of California system
needed to modernize and become the leading multiversity in higher education.  Kerr expanded the size of
each university branch and lobbied for increased funding, which exemplified his faith in old-school
liberalism and the concept of economic growth.[9]  During his tenure, Kerr altered the academic mission of
the university and changed the top priority from teaching students to research.  A true multiversity, Kerr
suggested, would help increase national economic growth through vigorous research and development
—military research included.  Essentially, the University of California became an industry whose product
was knowledge.
            Kerr saw the student demonstrations in conflict with the new academic mission of the university.  On
September 14 Kerr issued specific instructions to Katherine Towle, the Dean of Students.  Towle issued a
letter to all student organizations banning all political activities, fund-raising, and informational tables from
the Bancroft and Telegraph area.[10]  With activity outlawed at Bancroft and Telegraph, student political
organizations had no on-campus location to distribute literature, organize, or assemble.
            The student response to Towle’s memo was immediate and assertive.  Fourteen different political
organizations, including SDS, SNCC, and the College Republicans, banded together to form the United
Front.[11]  Immediately, several graduate students rose to leadership positions.  Art Goldberg, Jack Weinberg,
Jackie Goldberg, and Michael Rossman were graduate students who played instrumental roles throughout the
conflict.  The most influential and vocal of the United Front and the FSM was Mario Savio, a charismatic
New York native and liberal devoted to civil rights.[12]  Savio was a first-year philosophy graduate student in
1964.  He, like many other Berkeley students, spent the summer of ’64 in a Mississippi freedom school
teaching African-Americans.  He was deeply affected by what he saw in Mississippi and came to Berkeley
that fall with the intention of fighting the civil rights battle in the north.[13]  Savio’s passion, drive, and
assertive rhetoric made him an easy choice as the United Front’s point man for decision-making and
negotiations.
            Two days after they received Towle’s letter, Savio and other United Front leaders issued a petition to
the Dean, urging that she rescind her decision.[14] In a meeting with the United Front, Towle agreed to allow
tables at Bancroft and Telegraph, but only informational—not advocative political literature—could be
distributed.[15] Savio and the other student leaders rejected the proposition.
            After the failed meting with Towle, Savio and the United Front decided that regular tactics of
petitioning and negotiating would not work with the administration.  From September 21 until the first week
in October, the United Front sponsored protests and vigils all over the campus.  The upper level of the
Berkeley administration, indifferent during the initial days of the crisis, took serious notice after a week of
student protests.  Chancellor Edward Strong issued a statement that allowed advocative literature to be
distributed at the Bancroft and Telegraph entrance, but the ban on demonstrations and fund-raising
continued.[16] Kerr supported Strong’s decision, but remained silent on the issue.  For the next two days, the
United Front set up tables at the Bancroft and Telegraph entrance.  On September 29, the groups occupying
the tables quickly broke the regulations made by Chancellor Strong the day before.  They recruited members,
demonstrated, and collected donations for their political causes.  “We decided to set up the tables, express our
right to collect money on the campus, because the campus—in our view—was public property…We wanted
to establish the right to collect money on any piece of public property,” explained one United Front
member.[17] Strong instructed university officials to take the names of any student organizations collecting
funds or demonstrating in front of the Sather Gate entrance.[18]
            On September 30, the Berkeley chapters of SNCC and the Congress on Racial Equality (CORE) set
up tables at Bancroft and Telegraph and continued to collect donations.  In a matter of minutes,
representatives from the dean of student’s office took the names of five student organizers and asked them to
appear in front of the dean.  The students complied, but were followed to the dean’s office by 500 other
United Front members, led by Savio and Goldberg.  Strong ordered that the dean suspend the five student
activists.[19] In turn, Savio and the 500 other students demanded that they too be suspended.  Savio
coordinated a sit-in at Sproul Hall, which included the dean’s office, and threatened to stay until Strong and
Towle lifted the five suspensions or suspended all United Front members.  It was at this protest that Savio
truly illustrated his rhetoric and leadership proficiency.  In improvised orations Savio addressed the sit-in
crowd.  He regarded the university as a privileged minority that “manipulates the university…to suppress the
vast, virtually powerless majority.”[20] Savio argued that he no longer saw the crisis as a small campus issue,
but as a broader question of students’ rights to freedom of speech and the First Amendment.  Thus, the
United Front was renamed the Free Speech Movement.  Savio, Goldberg, and others urged the Berkeley
student body to work tirelessly until the administration recognized their First Amendment rights.
            The groundbreaking events of the crisis occurred on October 1 and 2, the days following the first
sit-in.  Student members of the FSM again set up tables at the Bancroft and Telegraph location and continued
to solicit funds.  Representatives from the dean’s office, accompanied by the campus police, approached the
student activists and asked them to cease and desist from any further action.  The small group of students
refused.  One graduate student, Jack Weinberg, was arrested for trespassing and placed in a police car.[21]
One female student described Weinberg’s arrest stating, “I thought the administration’s action was
despicable.  This was a wrong which had to be righted immediately because it would set a precedent for
denying more rights.”[22] Immediately, as if planned, hundreds of passing students sat around the police car
and blocked all possible exit routes.  The crowd caused a great commotion and within a matter of minutes,
several hundred more students placed themselves around the car.  Savio removed his shoes and climbed to the
roof of the vehicle and began to call for Weinberg’s release.  Savio quickly turned the standoff into a forum
for pressing the FSM agenda.  “We are being denied our rights by them.  We will stand around this police car
until they negotiate with us.”[23] Savio spoke with so much passion that it was hard not to listen to him.  He
demanded the complete attention of the students, faculty, and administration.  Savio’s strength was his
uncanny ability to understand and articulate the thoughts and ideas of his peers.  According to W.J.
Rorabaugh, “His [Savio’s] power came from his ability to articulate a tone that expressed the frustrations and
anxieties of his generation.  While others were as angry as Savio, they found it impossible to articulate their
anger.”[24] Despite his emotion and anger, Savio managed to keep the large and growing crowd under
control.
            President Kerr, in San Francisco, was notified of the growing problems on the Berkeley campus. 
Strong called Kerr and informed him of the situation, but greatly exaggerated the extent of the predicament. 
He advised Kerr to request the assistance of California Gov. Pat  Brown and the National Guard.[25] Kerr
pondered the request, but eventually decided against it.  Instead, he chose to meet with the FSM leadership,
essentially calling an end to the police car protest/sit-in.  Savio, Jackie Goldberg, and other FSM
representatives met with Kerr and Strong on October 2 and after several hours of discussion, came to a
resolution.  The students agreed to end the illegal protest around the police car.  Kerr and the rest of the
administration agreed to drop the charges against Weinberg, and decided to set up a meeting with the FSM to
discuss on-campus political behavior.  The administration allowed the Academic Senate, composed of
faculty, to review the five student suspensions from September 30.[26]
Temporarily satisfied, Savio climbed atop the police car once again and asked the students to go
home.  At this point, the FSM was at the peak of its popularity.  In a survey conducted after October 2, over
50 percent of the student body approved the goals and tactics of the FSM leadership.[27] Resistance to the
FSM mainly came from the Greek community and the student government—the Associated Students of the
University of California (ASUC).  The Greeks were inherently against the liberal nature of the protests and
vehemently denounced non-conformists.  The leaders of the ASUC were essentially puppets of the
administration and looked to Kerr for approval on any topics that came before them.  Kerr instructed the
ASUC to denounce the Berkeley demonstrations.[28]
Despite the FSM-Kerr agreement, neither side trusted the other.  Savio continued to coordinate
protests and rallies on campus to maintain student and faculty support.[29] Kerr in turn, lobbied for faculty
support.  He granted the faculty a large role by charging them with authority in determining the fate of the
suspended students.  Most of the faculty, however, distrusted and disliked Kerr’s handling of the situation. 
Many faculty members were proponents of the civil rights movement and saw Kerr’s actions as a limitation
of on-campus civil rights.[30] Moreover, the faculty resented Kerr’s attempt to link the FSM with communist
and socialist organizations.  Even though small numbers of socialists participated in the FSM rallies, they
seemed no more influential than the Goldwaterites or the campus Republicans.  “Only 4.5 percent of the
students arrested in the December 2-3 sit-in in Sproul Hall belonged to “radical” groups…Furthermore, 57
percent of the students belonged to no political organizations at all.”[31] The faculty and student’s distrust of
Kerr increased in November when Kerr replaced an Academic Senate subcommittee with pro-administration
faculty who voted in favor of suspending the five student activists.  Outraged leaders of the FSM held
massive protests and sit-ins at Sproul Plaza until Kerr agreed to reorganize the Academic Senate and allow
student representatives help rule on the case.  On November 9, the FSM issued a statement explaining their
resentment.
“It [the Administration] demands the privilege to usurp the prerogatives of the courts, to
pre-judge whether an act of advocacy is illegal…It demands this privilege as a tool to repress
student social and political activity when outside pressures become great enough.  At present
it seems most responsive to pressures asking that it crush the Civil Rights movement.”[32]
 
Eventually Kerr agreed, but added administrators to the committee.  Nevertheless, the new committee lifted
the suspensions.[33]
            Upset by the decision of the Academic Senate subcommittee, Kerr and the Regents took matters into
their own hands.  Savio and three other FSM leaders were put on probation for their roles in the October 1
and 2 protests and later reviewed for suspension.[34] The FSM planned a major on-campus demonstration to
respond to Kerr and his new directives.  Savio and Art Goldberg planned a well-advertised sit-in at Sproul
Plaza scheduled for December 2.  The FSM spread the word quickly; they hoped that the administration
would take action against the sit-in.  The FSM leadership created new objectives, looking not only to gain
free speech on campus, but also seeking to embarrass Kerr and the administration.  At a pre sit-in rally on
December 2, Savio articulated the importance of the movement.  He said:
“There is a time when the operation of the machine becomes so odious, makes you so sick at
heart, that you can’t take part; you can’t even passively take part, and you’ve got to put your
bodies upon the gears and upon the wheels, upon the levers, upon all the apparatus and you’ve
got to make it stop.  And you’ve got to indicate to the people who run it, to the people who
own it, that unless you’re free, the machines will be prevented from working at all.”[35]
 
            Shortly after the rally, more than 1,000 Berkeley students entered all four levels of Sproul Hall and sat
down.  Students who did not participate in the sit-down, picketed outside or went on strike.  Some estimates
suggest that 3,500 students picketed, while 1,900 went on strike.[36] For hours, students sat in Sproul Hall
singing songs, reciting civil rights chants, and making plans for further action.  Police guarded the Sproul
Hall entrances and exits, but there was no violence or damage inside the building.  A student participant
described the atmosphere as “congenial, relaxed, and partylike.”[37] At 3:45 a.m., the party stopped and
Chancellor Strong ordered all students to leave the building or be arrested for trespassing.  No one acceded to
his demand, and several hundred police officers dragged 773 student protestors out of the building.[38] As
police officers entered the building, students used tactics taken from the civil rights movement like going
“limp” when being taken by police.[39] Some accounts reported that officers, frustrated by the disobedience,
used heavy force in removing students.[40]
            While police might have broken the demonstration, the sit-in at Sproul Hall could be counted as a
success.  The next day, the Academic Senate unanimously passed a resolution urging the university
administration to lift disciplinary actions against those arrested before December 2.  Most significantly, the
Senate resolution demanded that students be allowed to engage in on-campus political activity.[41] The
resolution was wildly popular with the FSM.  Faculty leaders scheduled a campus-wide meeting in which
students, faculty, and administrators could review the Senate’s proposal and come to a final resolution.  The
meeting occurred at the campus Greek Theatre.  Thousands of students were in attendance to watch President
Kerr accept the terms of the Senate resolution.  As Kerr was leaving the stage, Savio approached the podium,
several police officers intercepted him.[42] The crowd broke into frenzy as Savio struggled with the officers. 
Even though Kerr finally let him address the crowd, the peace that seemed to be in place minutes earlier
disappeared.
            A week later, the Regents held an emergency meeting at Berkeley to address the events of the past
semester.  Of course, several hundred FSM members met the Regents with pickets and protests calling for
freedom of speech.  In their ruling, the Regents overturned the Academic Senate resolution and attested that
all arrests or disciplinary measures taken against students since October 2 were final.[43] The Regents
reasserted their authority as the primary source of law for the University of California system.  Kerr made
little comment on the Regents’ decision, but did recognize their authority in the matter.  For his
mismanagement of the crisis, the Regents chastised Strong.  The decision itself did not please the FSM, but it
was clear that with the support of the faculty, victory was theirs.  The Regents’ rules technically never went
into effect.  Chancellor Strong resigned his position a week later, and the interim Chancellor Martin
Meyerson issued a letter on January 3, stating the new rules for political activity.[44] Meyerson allowed the
steps of Sproul Hall to be an open forum for political discussion.  Tables could be placed at a number of
on-campus locations, and political speakers were allowed in Sproul Plaza.[45]
Analyzing Berkeley
            The central question in analyzing the events at Berkeley in the fall of 1964 is:  Why was the FSM
successful?  No single explanation can alone explain the level of success the student protestors achieved. 
One of the most important of these factors was certainly the quality of leadership and the tactics used by the
FSM.  Led by Savio, Goldberg, and Weinberg, the movement had experienced protestors, well versed in the
ways of civil disobedience and new liberalism.  Both Savio and Goldberg had participated in Freedom
Summer.  They taught at freedom schools, marched, demonstrated, and performed at sit-ins.  Here, it seems
that the FSM leadership learned the importance of non-violence and moderate protest tactics.  When
performing sit-ins or protests, the FSM leadership instructed other members on how to go “limp” and remain
non-violent when attacked by officers.  This proved extremely useful at the Sproul Hall sit-in while officers
were using force to drag the non-violent students from the building.  Through video footage, it is clear that
the non-violent tactics were almost always used and garnered support from onlookers, especially faculty.[46]
On October 1 and 2, during the police car sit-in, Savio instructed all those who were on top of the car to
remove their shoes so not to scuff the roof.  When the sit-in ended, the protestors donated $455.01 to pay for
any damage done to the car.[47] The leaders, most notably Savio, knew how to control combustible
situations, through non-violence.  This tactic gave the FSM an image of peaceful demonstrators virtuously
seeking civil rights on campus.[48]
            Savio and the other FSM leaders also had a unique ability to mobilize, motivate, and organize an
extremely large student body.  Through intense imagery and creative rhetoric, the FSM recruited members for
their fight.  Radical leaders presented the FSM as a fight to preserve the United States Constitution.  They
consistently read excerpts from the Constitution concerning the First Amendment and free speech.  At most
rallies the American flag was present.  Even though most of the leadership was radical or even “red-diaper
babies” (the progeny of American socialists and communists) they did not polarize themselves through
extreme socialist or communist speech, as other activists would later do.  They were not calling for a
revolution, but for reform.  They effectively articulated the thoughts, ideas, and feelings of their generation,
but did so with moderation.  Most students saw Berkeley as a multiversity that was using them to produce
research and knowledge.  At one of the initial rallies, Weinberg addressed the idea of a multiversity.
I want to tell you about this—uh—knowledge factory that we’re all sitting here now.  It seems
certain…of the products are not coming out to standard specification …Occasionally, a few
students get together and decide that they are human beings.  Some students get together and
decide that they are not…willing to be products.”[49]
 
Students identified with the FSM's anger and feelings of isolation.  At times, however, the anger and emotion
of the FSM leadership interrupted negotiations and perhaps prolonged the crisis.  At several points, Savio was
forced to leave meetings with Kerr and Strong because he could not control his temper.  Students, however,
were attracted to this rage and followed Savio's lead.  The number of people who participated in at least one
FSM event is well into the thousands.  Without the manpower and support, the FSM could not have won. 
                        The FSM also appeared much better prepared to engage in a battle than the administration. 
The leadership of the FSM came to campus that fall looking for someone to challenge.  Many of them,
inspired by their civil rights work, wanted to make a change at Berkeley in some capacity.  Once again, many
students were experienced in protest, non-violence, and civil disobedience.  The FSM leadership effectively
tied their cause to the civil rights movement, and therefore, gained the sympathy of many liberals.  Savio
especially had a talent for paralleling the FSM with the SCLC and Martin Luther King.
In his work, An End to History, Savio makes repeated references to the movement.
“Last summer I went to Mississippi to join the struggle there for civil rights.  This fall I am
engaged in another phase of the same struggle, this time in Berkeley.  The same rights are at
stake in both places—the right to participate as citizens in democratic society and the right to
due process of law.  In Mississippi an autocratic and powerful minority rules…to suppress the
vast virtually powerless majority.  In California, the privileged minority manipulates the
university bureaucracy to suppress the students’ political expression.”[50]
 
            The administration, on the other hand, was arrogant and aloof.  Chancellor Strong was not concerned
with students, but government funding research, and the production of knowledge.  Students, it seems, were a
means to his end.  He proved his ineptitude in handling students and campus problems throughout the fall. 
Kerr, though more thoughtful, was detached from the situation for most of the semester.  His main office was
in close proximity in San Francisco, but his trips to Berkeley were not frequent.  When he did address the
students, he proved as inept as String.  Forcefully removing 700 students from Sproul Hall in December
destroyed any student of faculty support that he had.  By not letting Savio address the crowd at the Greek
Theatre a week later, Kerr ruined any chance that he had of making peace with the FSM.  Even though the
FSM was by no means faultless they were better prepared.  The activists,
“were better prepared for war than Kerr.  First, they knew what they wanted.  Although their
specific demands changed over time, they demanded an end to the regulation of political
activity on campus.  This was called free speech.  Kerr…could only wave a sheaf of ever
changing regulations…which appeared to be shifting responses to pressure.”[51]
 
            The final, and possibly most significant factor in determining the success of the FSM, was the support
from the faculty.  When the uprisings began in September, there was no structure in place for the students to
create policy or make recommendations to the administration and Regents.  Automatically, they were
fighting a dispute they had nearly no chance of winning.  Originally, however, the faculty served mostly as
mediators between the students and administration.  It was not until after the Sproul Hall debacle in
December, when the faculty showed full public support for the students.  As the protestors pressed ahead,
more faculty sympathized and supported the objectives of the FSM.  Furthermore, many Berkeley faculty
members were liberals by 1964.  They had witnessed the civil rights movement in the South and sympathized
with its goals.  Some faculty saw the FSM as a microcosm of the civil rights movement, except it was a
northern, white, student version.  Faculty viewed the suppression of the FSM by the administration as a
repression of civil rights.  During the December 8 Academic Senate meeting, the liberal faculty voiced their
concerns and showed support for student activism.  Professors of liberal disciplines spoke in defense of the
FSM.  Sociology professor Philip Selznik stated:  “We are not in the business here of regulating speech…I
sincerely hope we shall conclude here, a movement toward a policy that protects the content of speech and
that assumes the risks of that protection.”[52] History professor Kenneth Stamp defended the students’ rights
in his comments.  “ I don’t think the Board of Regents can delegate any rights to our students.  These rights
they have under the Constitution of the United States…The Regents neither delegate these rights nor are
empowered, I think, to take them away.”[53]
            President Kerr also managed to alienate the faculty.  He consistently put the ideas and requests of
politicians and the Regents before those of the faculty.  Kerr and Strong both regarded the faculty as
components of the multiversity and knowledge factory.[54] Most faculty, however, believed in the
democracy of the university system, but felt that students and faculty were wrongly excluded from
participation.  In some ways, it seemed the faculty saw itself as victims of the “machine” as much as
students.  When the Academic Senate passed the resolutions supporting student political activity, they
essentially abandoned the administration.  Without the majority of faculty support, the Regents and Kerr
were outnumbered and any laws they passed against the students would have been rejected.  Even with the
impressive leadership, non-violent tactics, and disengaged administration, the FSM may not have won if it
were not for the faculty support.
            The Berkeley Free Speech Movement heavily influenced the evolution of the New Left.  The FSM
was a major factor that established the initial ideologies, philosophies, and tactics of the early New Left.  The
FSM was the first time that the New Left movement waged a major protest on a college campus.  Students
also proved, unlike the early SDS, that they could organize and operate on their own without the assistance of
big business or organized labor.  Throughout the fall semester, the FSM showed a propensity for restraint and
moderation that attracted the support of many liberals.  The effective student leadership and impressive
protest tactics used at Berkeley inspired college students across the nation.  What ensued was a flood of
student protests and New Left movements for students’ rights and later, an end to the Vietnam War.  The
FSM was not a perfect movement, nor was it devoid of any blame for the events that took place. 
Furthermore, it cannot fully be free of blame for the future tragedies of the movement.  The FSM set up the
blueprint for student activism in the 1960s.  Through non-violent tactics, effective leadership, and strong
coalitions with third parties, student activists engaged in several years of protest.  By 1968, however, the call
for reform changed to a call for revolution. The moderation present in the FSM was gone, and the student
movement spiraled out of control and splintered.  The golden promise so evident at Berkeley in 1964 was
later consumed by violence and chaos.
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The Old Order Amish community located in Arthur, Illinois has grown dramatically since its founding
in 1865.  The bonds of religion, community and trust continue to unite its members and maintain their
cohesive framework; they do not oppose technological advancement, nor deny its benefits.  Instead, Amish
residents wish to live their lives within self-imposed boundaries stressing religion and community.  They
remain humble and set social limits for themselves: they wear plain clothing, prefer anonymity to celebrity,
and prohibit the use of electricity in their lives.  Their beliefs differ from most non-Amish Americans, also
known as the "English," by stressing their conservative Anabaptist theology in every aspect of their lives. 
This research explores the courtship, marriage and gift-giving practices within Arthur's Old Order Amish
community in an attempt to ascertain how and why certain changes in Amish tradition have occurred over the
years.
As the community changes from an agrarian society to an increasingly entrepreneurial one, wedding
customs adapt to this new environment.  To present the impact of such change, various aspects of Amish
weddings have been researched and subsequently divided into the following discussions: courtship practices
and age at the time of marriage, wedding preparations and ceremony, changes in the wedding gift-giving
process, and the variables determining when Amish couples marry.  The marriage data spans one hundred
years of Amish settlement, providing a cohesive image of Amish marriage from the 1880s until the 1980s.
The first step on the road to marriage, of course, is meeting the right partner.  Amish teens, similar to
their "English" counterparts, begin dating around the age of sixteen.  Having completed their education at the
end of eighth grade, young Amish continue to live with their parents and spend their days working on a farm
or in a shop.  The Amish community oversees courtship practices in Arthur, which in turn helps maintain the
continuity of the local Amish population.  Within the community, courtship is a natural step toward maturity,
although some of their traditions may surprise outsiders.  Not yet members of the church, many Amish teens
experiment with their mainstream surroundings; they may listen to music, wear popular fashions or infiltrate
other aspects of "English" society.  While these un-baptized Amish teens are technically allowed to date
non-Amish teens, few do.  Most Amish teenagers opt to remain within the comfort of their community to
marry rather than leaving their family and the only home they have ever known.
            As a means of transportation, boys of courting age usually secure a horse and buggy in order to call
upon Amish girls.  Tradition dictates that Amish boys must never visit Amish girls during the daytime; boys
wait until a girl's parents retire for the evening before visiting.[1]  This custom contradicts mainstream
American dating habits but the Amish community trusts their children and maintains this practice.  This habit
derives from traditional societal gender rules taught in Amish society.  Judith Nagata’s study shows that “the
young Amish have been taught from early childhood that to speak of attraction between the sexes is
improper,”[2] although dating allows a boy and girl to spend an extended amount of time together without
presenting any social  faux pas.  On Saturday night, the popular date night in the community, teens participate
in activities such as taking buggy rides, playing party games with a group of friends, or spending an evening
together at home. 
When a girl decides to start dating, she wears a black prayer cap and a white apron with a cape,
signifying her coming of age and eligibility to the boys in the community.  If a woman remains unmarried
into her mid thirties, “she more often than not takes off the white cape and apron, dons a black set instead,
and laughingly tells her friends, ‘I joined the old maids.’”[3]  As in mainstream society, after a boy and girl
go on ten or so dates together they often become a steady couple.  Their paired-off status quickly spreads
throughout the close-knit community.  The uniqueness of Amish courtship helps keep young people
interested and immersed in the community, thus maintaining its religious and cultural backbone in addition to
a substantial population.  Amish dating standards often help prepare a young couple for life within the Amish
community, as many steady couples join the church and marry soon thereafter.  Amish youth typically join
the church in their late teens, when the community feels they are able to join the Church by their own will
and choosing.  This delayed baptism is a common trait in Anabaptist theology, although for many people a
childhood steeped in Amish tradition naturally leads them towards life in the church.  Nevertheless, the
religion only wants members dedicated to their cause and refuses to force anyone against their own will and
choosing.  The primary requirement for marriage within the Amish community is membership in the Amish
church.  Thus, the sudden baptism of a steady pair may hint at their plans to marry.  Evidence indicates that
many Amish marriages occur at a young age, often during their late teens and early twenties.
The localized data spans a century of Amish settlement in Arthur and helps show the community’s
change over the years.[4]  Because common Amish surnames run rampant in the mainstream population, a
researcher must deduce which records do and do not reflect members of the Amish community based on
means other than by name alone. Clyde Browning’s Amish in Illinois listed Old Order Amish Bishops from
which Amish couples were located and researched.  The Moultrie and Douglas County marriage records
include the name of the individual presiding over each marriage ceremony, so the published list of Amish
bishops lead to the accurate compilation of Amish couples.  Similarly, while some couples with typical
Amish names could not be proven to be members of Arthur’s Old Order Amish community, they could not be
proved otherwise and the entry was removed from the sample.  The cumulative time span of this study,
1880-1980, presents the Arthur community and surrounding neighbors in the light of ongoing growth and
transition, a characteristic often overlooked by "English" society when thinking of the Amish.  Using data
compiled from both Amish and "English" marriages in Arthur and the surrounding counties, a detailed
examination of marriage ages shall provide further insight into the similarities and differences between the
two groups.
The analysis of evidence indicates that often only a few years passed between the time Amish teens
began courting and when they became baptized and married.  Because women tended to marry at an earlier
age than Amish men, this data proposes that women tended to join the church at a younger age.  The data
presented in figures 1 and 2[5] show that on average both Amish and “English” women married at a younger
age than men.  These figures illustrate 25 percent of Amish women marrying before age twenty, as compared
to a mere 9 percent of Amish men.  figures 1&2  This closely compares with the rest of society, as 35 percent
of "English" women and only 6 percent of "English" men marry before this young age.  Both sets of data
begin to even out between the ages of twenty to twenty two, as half of both Amish men and women and a
quarter of the "English" population married during these years.  Thus, between the years 1880 and 1980,
roughly 75 percent of Amish women marry before the age of 23 as compared to only 60 percent of Amish
men.  This contrasts with the Non-Amish population, where roughly half of women and only 44 percent of
men married as young.
Although this data includes but a small sampling of Arthur Amish marriages from the 1880s, the
records contain obvious age differences between Amish men and women.  Similarly, “English” records show
that the men were, on average, a few years older than their spouses.  The five Amish men who married during
the 1880s averaged a marrying age of 27.2 years.  This contrasts from their spouses’ ages, which averaged a
mere 20.0 years of age.  This noticeable age difference between man and wife suggests that traditionally,
Amish men were older than their brides, a practice still common but usually less noticeable today. 
Consequently, this trend continued throughout the century.  This both compares and contrasts with the
“English” population, whose ages are similar to the Amish, but are usually a bit older with larger age spreads
between bride and groom.  Also, the male population shows a steady decrease in marriage age over the
century, while "English" trends remain more constant, with a dramatic peak during the 1920s.
Women’s trends, while less pronounced, vary despite the fact that most women continue to marry at
or before the age of 23.  In fact, the averages remain between 20.0 and 22.5 years of age.  Peaks in the graph
are minor, and may be attributed to societal factors such as economic change, but may also be the result of
the small data sample presented in this study.  Nevertheless, until the final years of the sample, there were
noticeable differences between the ages of both man and wife.  This suggests that for a long time, marriage
ages among the central Illinois "English" indicated a different life progression from that of the Amish. 
Throughout the century, approximately 40 percent of “English” men married at twenty-six years of age or
older, fewer than 20 percent of Amish men did.  As the age increases the statistics become even clearer. As
nearly 25 percent of these "English" men married after age thirty, a mere 0.5 percent of Amish men did.  So
while the "English" tend to marry at an older age than their Amish neighbors, they also had a larger spread of
ages throughout the century, with the exception of the earliest years when the Amish spread was larger.  This
information correlates nicely with the discussion of traditional Amish opinion regarding marriage.
While many “English” children may wonder whom, or in latter decades, if, he or she shall marry,
Amish culture continues to teach that marriage is not only an important but an expected step in life.  There
are noticeable exceptions, however, as many Amish, like their “English” counterparts, choose to remain
single.  But to those who do marry, the decision was not as surprising or as celebratory as one may assume. 
To many the question was not if they will marry, but rather, when.  This is not to say that mainstream society
presented a less important version of marriage in the upbringing of their children.  Instead this argues that the
matter-of-fact attitude the Amish possess regarding marriage is a cultural answer to why many Amish
members continue to marry at a younger age than their “English” counterparts.  This attitude penetrated the
society and thus Amish weddings lacked the excitement and preparations often involved with a prolonged
engagement and a fancy ceremony. 
Seeing no point to a formalized engagement, Amish view marriage more as a financial union than as
an occasion for excess celebration.[6]  One reason Amish marriages lack the excitement of an ‘English’
engagement stems from the predictability of their occurrence.  Steady, long-term couples usually marry, so an
engagement comes as little surprise to friends and family.  Weddings are frequent within the Arthur
community, and the Amish consider them a natural step in life, so it is fairly expected for an Amish person to
marry.[7]  In lieu of the engagement process, the Amish prefer to keep wedding plans a secret until mere
weeks before the event.  Couples reveal their plans to marry during the last church service in the bride’s
district before the chosen day.[8]  Following this church announcement, also called a bann, the couple travels
through the community personally inviting friends and family to attend.  Wedding ceremonies are invitation
only events, separating weddings from other so-called rites of passage in Amish society such as baptisms and
funerals, which are open to the entire community. 
             The wedding ceremony shares similarities with traditional, non-Amish Christian ceremonies.  The
engaged couple chooses their bridal party, usually comprised of two males and two females who are close
friends of the couple and often dating each other. The bridal party attends to the bride and groom, wears the
designated wedding clothing, and sits in a designated spot during the ceremony.[9]  According to Arthur V.
Houghton, author of “Community Organization in a Rural Amish Community at Arthur, Illinois,” “All six
[attendants] are seated directly in front of the preacher except during the singing of the first hymn, during
which time the young people are taken into a separate room apart from the audience and instructed in the
mutual duties and decorum.”[10]  This of course mirrors the practice of incorporating bridesmaids and
groomsmen into a ceremony.  Despite the similarities amongst the bridal party, however, other aspects of an
Amish wedding further define their basis as a unique communal entity.
            The formal ceremony resembles an extended Sunday church service.  Unless circumstances prevent it,
Amish weddings occur in the home of the bride.  If this proves impossible, the groom’s house or another
Amish home provides an acceptable substitute.  Sometimes the event hosts two sermons, as ministers from
both the bride and groom’s Church districts may wish to speak.  Thus, a wedding ceremony may last several
hours.  The sermons, passages and hymns revolve around the pact of marriage, detailing the duties and
expectations of both bride and groom.  Vows are exchanged following this religious reminder of marital
responsibility. 
Continuing the simplicity in Amish dress, traditional wedding attire closely resembles styles worn
every Sunday by young Amish girls and teens.  The bride and her attendants wear the blue dresses with white
capes and aprons worn by girls of dating age. Wedding clothing is functional and often re-worn, promoting
the usefulness of Amish material culture.[11]  Before and during the ceremony both the bride and her
attendants don the traditional black ceremonial prayer cap.  Although the Amish community prohibits
materialistic expressions of symbolism such as engagement rings and other jewelry, the bride removes her
black prayer cap in exchange of a white cap at the conclusion of the wedding ceremony, signifying her status
as a married woman.  While the bride dons a specific article of clothing, the groom must now grow a full
beard to display his newly acquired position.  These signs, while creating obvious material symbolism within
the community, remain within the acceptable boundaries of both function and simplicity.[12]
            Amish weddings provide an ideal venue for the community to work as a cohesive unit; dozens of
friends and family members work together to assist with behind-the-scenes preparations for the wedding
ceremony and feast.  As Clyde Browning observes, “four or five couples act as waiters, and the bride’s
nearest girl relative is given the position of principal table waiter. Twelve to fourteen cooks are required to
prepare the feast; and this number is composed of the bride’s mother, the groom’s mother, aunts, sisters-
in-law, married sisters, and grandmothers.”[13]  Until recently, the bride’s parents usually did not attend their
daughter’s wedding because they were needed behind the scenes.[14]  Following the ceremony the bride’s
family serves a feast to hundreds of wedding guests and must find room to seat them all for a full dinner.  To
accommodate the large number of wedding guests, the feast usually requires multiple sittings requiring both
patience and cooperation.  Amish weddings revolve around religion, community and family, and while these
weddings lack the celebratory feel found in non-Amish ceremonies, the wedding day remains an exciting
event as the couple joins together with the help of their community’s assistance and generosity.
While the bride’s family supplies wedding guests with a feast, the guests present the bride and groom
with gifts.  Insight obtained during an oral interview with a local Amish couple focused on the local quilting
traditions and how these skills defined the importance of gift-giving as part of an Old Order Amish wedding
in Arthur, Illinois.[15]  In particular, a quilt given to an Amish bride in Arthur in 1978 provided substantial
evidence regarding the importance of gifts and materials in conjunction with a marriage.
At the time of marriage, engaged Amish women are provided with a dowry of sorts.  Her family
presents her with a supply of useful items including dishes, kerosene lamps and textiles.[16]  Thus, quilt
production within an Amish family usually heightens in preparation of a wedding.  The mother of the bride
customarily presents her daughter with a quilt or two, often accompanied by a comforter.  The informant
explained: “when her daughter gets her quilt from home it would be what we call a Sunday-Best quilt.”[17] 
A Sunday-Best quilt is often of a higher aesthetic value, and is cherished and displayed only on Sundays or
during other special events.  Seen as an important gift from home, daughters look forward to taking a
homemade quilt to their new household.  Additionally, the bride’s grandmother often pieces a quilt as a gift
for the new bride to finish.[18]  Generation after generation the cycle continues, and the new bride will one
day present her daughter with a quilt on her wedding day.  The interviewee, for example, completed both a
comforter and a quilt for her child’s wedding.  She explained that it is important and comforting to “have a
quilt from home, or a couple [of quilts.]”[19]  In preparation for her wedding in 1978, her two sisters utilized
their high skill of quilting to produce a solid, cream-colored top sheet intricately quilted with difficult quilting
patterns, allowing the creative talents of the family to become the visual focus.  Thus, the personal worth of
an Amish quilt is much more important than any monetary amount or juried appraisal of artistic merit. 
Quilting traditions pass from mother to daughter, and in this case, amongst siblings, further enhancing the
personal significance of receiving an item at a wedding.  But, despite all this, while the Amish cherish their
home-produced goods, monetary gifts continue to gain popularity as the community transitions from their
agrarian roots to an increasingly industrial existence. 
This industrial trend provokes the temptation to provide a newlywed couple with a monetary
contribution rather than a homemade gift.  A seemingly thoughtless endeavor, cash lacks the preparation time
and effort involved with other kinds of gifts.  According to Judith Nagata, “It was originally the custom in
Arthur, at least until after World War II, for all gifts at weddings to be left, unwrapped and unlabeled, on one
of the beds in the bride’s home for viewing after the ceremony.”[20]  Nowadays, she continues, the Arthur
Amish often incorporate elaborate gift-wrapping and cards in their gift presentation.  Since gift-givers no
longer maintain anonymity, the natural habit of one-upmanship threatens to take over the altruistic gesture
formerly associated with the process.[21]  There are but a few designated community events involving the
exchange of gifts.  As Nagata explains, “Most inter-household gift exchanges not involving cash are
restricted to the purely ceremonial context of weddings, birthdays, funerals, visiting and churchgoing.”[22] 
Amish quilting practices are seen as a symbol of unity, exemplifying the sense of the community in Arthur. 
The work ethic and lifestyle of the Amish, including all jobs related to their daily life, directly relates to the
material production and sustenance present in an Amish homestead.
Therefore, the agrarian make-up of East Central Illinois’ landscape remains a major factor in how
people run their lives.  Agricultural responsibilities, in conjunction with religious and familial traditions,
dictate feasible times for weddings.  The necessary preparation time needed in order to both plan and host a
successful wedding and ceremony for the community was carefully scheduled around the busy Amish
calendar.  As farming demands more attention during the spring and summer seasons, few weddings occur. 
Therefore, an influx of weddings occur during the late fall and winter months.  Between 1880 and 1980
marital traditions surface regarding the extent to which cultural and agricultural factors affect Amish
weddings.  As with the study of ages at the time of marriage, a comparison with non-Amish marriages helps
define these cultural traditions, setting them apart from mainstream society.
Between 1880 and 1980 more than 75 percent of Amish marriages occurred during the colder half of
the year.  Table 3 indicates that an agrarian model dictated Amish marriage.  Recent agricultural changes
continue to force many Amish from the farm, searching for home shops and other entrepreneurial means of
income.  Thus, during the last decade or so of this study, the 1970s and early 1980s, economic changes took
its toll on traditional society.  No longer solely reliant on the agrarian calendar, marriages now occur more
frequently throughout the year, suggesting that Amish wedding tradition is not static.  Although the central
Illinois region has long been collectively associated with agriculture, the "English" marriage data shows
noticeably contrasting information.  One would assume that although their lifestyles differ, Amish and
non-Amish agricultural schedules would dictate the occurrence of weddings.  A quick examination shows a
deviation from this hypothesis.  table 3  As early as the 1880s and continuing through the rest of the century,
the spread of non-Amish marriage ceremonies is fairly consistent throughout the year.  In fact, some decades
produced a majority of weddings during the spring and summer months.  How these "English" weddings
were planned during these busy times is uncertain, but the evidence clearly presents a separation of the two
groups, allowing the Amish to further define themselves and maintain their traditions throughout the year.
A more specific look at Amish marriages shows the definition and deviation from this tradition,
slowly but steadily, over the course of the century.  The Amish respond to trends and change as do their
"English" neighbors, and a wedding during the warmer months probably sounds more attractive to many new
couples.  By comparing the twenty earliest and twenty latest marriages in the study, the oldest records clearly
define the common fall and winter wedding practices hypothesized for the community while recent records
demonstrate otherwise.  table 4  Within this sample, 86 percent of marriages between the years before and
shortly after the turn of the century took place between October and January, compared with only 50 percent
during the latter years of this study.  In addition, the recent records span ten months of the year, omitting only
February and April.  "English" tradition also hints of change over the years, as summer weddings became
more fashionable.  Thus, as the Amish struggle to keep their traditions and maintain their sense of
community, their reliance on an agricultural lifestyle lessens.  However, it appears as though even if time is
not a factor, many couples apparently prefer to marry in the winter for the sake of tradition and communal
nostalgia.
            The annual wedding cycle, segregated by month, comprises only one societal factor taken into
consideration when deciding to marry.  The busy Amish calendar often dictates which day of the week a
ceremony may occur.  Wedding preparation time usually lasts one week, as the home is cleared to prepare
food and arrangements.  In addition, the Amish do not engage in work of any kind on Sundays, as they spend
the day consumed with church and other religious activities.  The unavailability of Sundays discourages
planning a wedding early in the week.  Multiple sources[23] explain that most Amish weddings occur on
either Tuesdays or Thursdays; Clyde Browning provides a viable explanation as to why:
The marriage ceremonies are customarily held on Tuesday or Thursday; for weddings are
festive occasions and the Amish believe that worship and work should come before pleasure. 
Therefore,  Monday  is  preparation  day;  Wednesday  is  set  aside  for  unfinished  chores  and
household duties; and Friday and Saturday are spent in preparation for Sunday, a day reserved
for rest and worship only.[24]
Clearly, the differences between the 200 Amish and non-Amish marriages by weekday, outweigh the
similarities.  Notice the overwhelming number of Amish marriages occurring on Thursdays, followed by
much less common choices of Tuesdays and Sundays.  Mondays, due to reasons previously discussed, hosted
only a single wedding. table 5  Browning’s similar study, a sample of 109 marriages between the years 1950
and 1961, also includes just one wedding held on a Monday, with 63 percent of weddings preformed on
Thursdays.[25]  In order to track changes over the duration of the data, this information must be further
prodded.  A comparison of the oldest twenty and most recent twenty records indicates the changing trend
over time.  Thursdays are still by far the most popular day for such an event, but the older data shows half of
the ceremonies occurred on Sundays. table 6  Amish marriages only occur on Sundays when there is no
Church service, suggesting that church services have not always been available on a weekly basis, and
weddings occurred during alternating weeks.  Sunday ceremonies discontinue shortly before and after the
turn of the century.  Perhaps by this time Amish church services secured a weekly schedule.  By the time
industry became a dominant factor, the Amish solely favored weekdays for weddings.  This is apparent in the
data, as table 6 presents a complete lack of Monday ceremonies.  Therefore, the day of the week on which an
Amish couple marries matters more than the month of the year, because more constraints exist for weekdays,
and higher percentages of couples married during a certain day rather than in a certain month of the year. 
The “English” data, while noticeably different from that of the Amish, present some interesting
findings.  First of all, the data shows that weekends are favored over weekdays, especially Tuesdays and
Thursdays, the preferred days for the Amish.  As more and more “English” people worked 9 A.M. to 5 P.M.
schedules with weekends free for weddings, the lack of Tuesdays and Thursdays in the data supports the
contrast with Amish traditions nicely.  One would, therefore, assume that weekday ceremonies would be
uncommon for people maintaining different lifestyles.  But as table 5 shows,  "English" ceremonies occurred
steadily throughout the week, an alarming contrast to the sample of Amish ceremonies.  The reason for these
mid-week marriages, however, requires its own study to fully understand.  Nevertheless, the differences
found in both sets of data further segregate Amish tradition from mainstream society, suggesting that Amish
marital tradition is based less on the agricultural workload than originally thought.  Instead, the routine of the
standard Amish week, with church services and preparations and community events, combined with a sense
of tradition, are the deciding factors when planning a wedding.
The uniqueness of Amish marital traditions in Arthur, Illinois becomes pronounced when teens start
dating and continues through the wedding ceremony.  Popular Amish dating traditions prepare couples for
church membership, followed by a traditional wedding ceremony and immersion in the community.  This
research showed that the Amish tend to marry earlier in life than the surrounding population, adding to
Amish ideas promoting marriage as an important and expected step in life.  Their non-Amish neighbors often
waited until later in life to marry and start families. Amish traditions continue as an engagement
announcement is made and the ceremony is planned.  The glowing differences regarding the months of the
year chosen by the two populations suggests that the agricultural calendar does not completely decide when a
couple may wed.  Rather, as the non-Amish often preferred the warmer months of the year despite their
agricultural surroundings, many Amish remained tethered to a cultural cord favoring the fall and winter
seasons.  The pressure for change, as increased technology took over more Amish and non Amish farms,
occurred throughout the century as Amish couples began to marry during alternate seasons.  While this data
provides increased insight into the ever-changing life of a new Amish couple, this is certainly not a
cumulative examination of the Amish community, their traditions and preferences.  Additionally, much time
has passed since the early 1980s; a steady increase of home shops (home-based craft businesses) and the
decline of farming continue to pressure the Amish to change their traditions. 
Individual situations and reasoning varies, but the results remain similar.  The interviewed informant,
for example, continues to farm the their land with her husband, but all six members of the family work in
local Amish businesses.  Also, they stopped raising pigs a few years back, as their equipment wore out and
prices rose beyond their reach.[26]   Increased productivity of non-Amish farming equipment, as well as the
cost of land, makes farming a difficult means of support for an Arthur Amish family.  The increase in
wage-earning people also increases the use of monetary profits as gifts, and the community continues its slow
transition away from the intrinsic creation of quality, homemade gifts.  Only time will tell the long-term
effects these changes will have on the community and their marriage traditions.  But, regardless of the
outcome, the Arthur Amish community continues to grow and adapt to their increasingly industrialized
surroundings, all the while staying true to their core beliefs, their community and themselves.
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On May 4 1970, the U.S. National Guard shot and killed four Kent State University students during a
protest against the Vietnam War.  Southern Illinois University students, reacting against the killings, shut
down the school by setting fire to and destroying several campus buildings.  Columbia University
experienced similar uprisings, as did scores of campuses across the nation.  In an era that appeared wrought
with extreme campus unrest culminating at Kent State University, Eastern Illinois University’s anti-war
protests, though sometimes heated, never reached such cataclysmic proportions. 
Unfortunately, few historical accounts examine smaller, less prestigious institutions and their
reactions to Vietnam.  The most notable works undertaken about this period usually analyze the larger
universities and infamous student demonstrations such as those at Columbia University in 1968 and Berkeley
in 1964.  Such sporadic reactions, however, are unrepresentative of American students.  Reading only these
works (usually authored by those students that actually experienced the sixties) suggests that university
violence was rampant.  Similarly, these studies are “SDS-centered”—Students for a Democratic Society
(SDS) was the largest, most noticeable sixties student organization.  Todd Gitlin, for example, a former SDS
president, penned the popular and insightful The Sixties: Years of Hope, Days of Rage.  The focus, however,
was solely on the SDS’s eventual destruction, ignoring universities like EIU where such an organization was
nonexistent.  Former sixties radicals and SDS members Tom Hayden and David Horowitz also plummet into
this pitfall.  The SDS, while indeed crucial to understanding student sentiments, did not encompass all
demonstrating students.
This study seeks to understand why EIU’s reactions to national events between 1968 and 1970 were
muted and reserved.  Answering such a broad question requires examining the evolution of antiwar feelings
and actions at EIU, keeping in mind that few universities experienced ferocious demonstrations were. 
Additionally, EIU President Quincy Doudna’s ingenious decision to refuse to directly oppose student and
faculty activism stifled reasons to violently rebel.  Third, neither the faculty nor the students were completely
unified.  Faculty divisions over the Vietnam War’s righteousness created student rifts, and, among those
students that did oppose the war, questions of sincerity created further splits.   Finally, the changing nature of
the university curriculum from science-centered to liberal arts- centered sowed the seeds of the “student
power” movement thereby creating a rift between students and faculty.  The faculty, supportive of Vietnam
demonstrations, disapproved of “student power” demands, leaving the students to question the faculty’s
sincerity regarding their antiwar sentiments.  This shifted student emphasis and energies away from Vietnam,
and towards issues directly related to students, including drugs, privacy issues, and gender equality.  These
factors divided the campus, weakened the anti-Vietnam movement, and prevented large gatherings or
demonstrations that could spiral out of control.
Reaching such a thesis required digging into University Archives for memos, letters, and statements
made by the faculty and administration regarding the Vietnam War.  Eastern News editorials, articles, and
student senate proclamations revealed student sentiment, while interviews with faculty and administration
members were also conducted.
EIU, like most universities, did not even begin seeing significant antiwar activism until after the 1967
draft expansion.  The Eastern News, for example, seldom mentioned the war.  Consequently, gauging the EIU
community’s (faculty, students, administration) attitude regarding Vietnam up to 1967 is difficult. 
Apparently, the EIU community never felt directly involved or threatened by the actions in Vietnam, thanks
largely to EIU’s parochial atmosphere, relatively minute size, and insular geographic location in central
Illinois.  The fiercest demonstrations, after all, occurred at large, research-oriented institutions like Columbia,
a school directly assisting the Federal Government by researching intelligence information used in Vietnam.
This prompted anti-Vietnam students to react more angrily and violently since their tuition money contributed
directly to the war effort.  EIU students, by contrast, did not see their  community directly involved or
threatened by the events occurring halfway around the world.
The faculty was actually more involved in campus unrest than the students, though internal factions
formed amongst both those opposed and those supportive of the Vietnam War.  These professorate’s activism
superseded that of the students because they more easily recognized the consequences of an extensive foreign
war and, being slightly older, they had lived during either one or both World War eras and experienced war’s
horrific effects.  Additionally, some faculty members may have had ties to those universities where protests
were more prevalent.  Such faculty activism, however, was a common phenomenon according to historian
Willis Rudy.  Rudy chronicles university faculty opposition to the Vietnam War explaining how, in 1965, 66
percent of professors supported President Johnson, while by 1968, reacting to the Tet Offensive, such
supporters were slinking into the anti-Vietnam camp.[1]  Nationally, Rudy found faculty responsible for
organizing and supporting over half of all campus protests.[2]
EIU was no exception. It was the radical faculty that insisted on EIU’s participation in the 15 October
1969 Vietnam Moratorium, a peaceful, nation-wide anti-Vietnam campus protest.  Theoretically, universities
faced student and faculty pressure to cancel all classes and discuss the Vietnam situation.[3]  On-campus
programs and lectures already had been approved, including planned discussion of the philosophy of U.S.
involvement in Vietnam, Vietnam’s history and politics, and the culminating lecture by Students for a
Democratic Society’s (SDS) founder Thomas Hayden entitled “Human Values and Achievements: Capitalism
or Socialism.”  The local Veteran’s Association also organized a morning memorial service for U.S. soldiers
killed in Vietnam, and several faculty members planned a half-hour faculty march.[4]  A Faculty Moratorium
Committee, headed by Dr. Robert Barford, constructed an official faculty policy statement endorsing the
Moratorium’s activities and encouraging faculty involvement.  It circulated a petition to faculty members
imploring their support by either signing a letter to President Nixon denouncing the war, or by actively
participating in the Moratorium.  This could be done by joining the faculty protest march, devoting the entire
class period to Vietnam discussion, or simply making an initial classroom statement regarding the Vietnam
War, which was acceptable for professors as “citizen-professors.”[5]  These radical professors, especially
Barford, even initiated an underground newspaper, The Fertilizer.  This publication, according to Dr. John
McElligott, a member of the history faculty, included anti-Vietnam articles and propaganda, pro-marijuana
articles, and pro-student rights editorials--but was primarily faculty-operated.[6]  The newspaper was so
secret that current EIU President Louis V. Hencken, a resident assistant at the time, was unaware of its
existence.[7]
Yet, while some faculty supported protest, these radicals appalled others.  Such opinions were more
prevalent among older faculty members, as some had either served in a world war or at least remembered the
war experience intimately.  The older, more hawkish generation clashed sharply with their younger
colleagues.  Anthropology Professor Lloyd Collins, for example, opposed the moratorium, insisting that such
action would provide the Viet Cong with psychological warfare and propaganda, possibly resulting in more
U.S. casualties.  He also feared active soldiers, upon hearing the anti-Vietnam actions back home, would be
demoralized and thus have their survivability weakened.[8]  Sue and Pat Allen, chairmen for the EIU Youth
for Nixon Organization, echoed Collins’s argument warning such protests would rejuvenate the North
Vietnamese morale and resolve, consequently lengthening rather than shortening the war.[9]  History
professor Dr. Lawrence R. Nichols also opposed faculty participation, but on less openly political grounds
than Collins; faculty, he argued, who used class time to discuss the incident, as Barford encouraged, violated
the American Association of University Professors (AAUP) teacher responsibilities by wrongly using their
position to encourage propaganda and indoctrination.[10]
There was a third faction, the neutral faculty, who were fearful of then President Quincy Doudna’s
wrath.  Retired EIU history professor Leonard Wood recalled that the old, hierarchical power structure
allowed Doudna to appoint every administration member and department chairperson.  Thus, if a chairperson
failed to maintain the status quo, Doudna could easily replace them.[11]  Untenured professors faced possible
reprisals.  Furthermore, the absence of a teacher’s union left professors completely unprotected and unable to
file grievances against Doudna unless they wished to climb through the extensive hierarchy, a process that
could last months.[12]  Regardless of these divisions, the Faculty Senate approved the Moratorium, stating
that “a university is a place for legitimate expression of sincere convictions and that neither the
administration nor the faculty should repress either activities or thought.”[13]
While the faculty undoubtedly led the Moratorium, the students were by no means silent.  Many
voiced their opinions both for and against the war, and editorials in the Eastern News reflected these student
body divisions.  Student H.O. Pinther, spoke for campus hawks, stating, “You, who choose not to fight for
your country, put your tail between your legs, snap on your collar and whine loudly so all will know you for
what you are.  For those of courage and principal, who want to be free, stand up for total and complete
victory.”[14]  Winfield Nash, responding directly to Pinther’s accusations of cowardice, argued, “I would say
this is true, but even so, it is better than putting your country before your logic, and being led around by a
leash of propaganda,”[15] implying that the U.S. government was misleading its citizens about the war’s
conduct and progress in order to paint a rosier picture and boost public approval.  An even harder stance
came from Kenneth Midkiff, also responding to Pinther’s editorial:
Every aspect of the Vietnam War is contrary to the American tradition.  America has always
represented freedom, independence, love and happiness, which are the very things the planners and
participants of the moratorium are extolling.  Ask yourselves then, you who are crying “traitor,
un-American and un-patriotic,” who is it that is unpatriotic, the opponents or the supporters of the
War in Vietnam?[16]
One student wrote an anti-draft play for the November 15 moratorium in which a young man talks to his
parents, friends, and a police officer about his impending army induction.[17]
Another division occurred not only along Pinther and Midkiff’s polar disagreements, but also over
student sincerity.  Students wondered whether such fanatical protestors like Midkiff would fully support or
actually participate in the Moratorium.  The Eastern News’ opinionated editorials expressed fears that
students would interpret the class cancellation as simply a vacation, rather than attend the Moratorium
activities and express genuine aspirations for total U.S. withdrawal.  Concerned students claimed that since
two-thirds of all EIU students were not in class at a given time, a better message would be sent if these
students voluntarily gave up free time to attend Moratorium activities, rather than musing it merely as an
excuse to skip class.[18]
Irrespective of these student divisions, radical faculty continued to support this Moratorium as
tensions developed not only over whether or not the moratorium should occur, but also whether the
administration or the faculty should participate, thus giving the protests official sponsorship.  Fears also arose
amid the community because several peaceful-turned-hostile campus protests had already occurred at several
universities, including Columbia University, fueling the fear that EIU’s protesting could lead to violence. 
Such worries struck Hencken who, while sitting down to eat at a local restaurant, had an unpleasant dinner
companion--several Illinois National Guard trucks loudly rumbling through Charleston, destined for Southern
Illinois University, where protests had turned ugly.[19] 
Violence did not occur, however, thanks mostly to Doudna’s careful handling of the situation,
avoiding clashes with student and faculty activists.   His crowning achievement occurred over the question of
class cancellation, a move vehemently opposed by many students, faculty, and administration.  Doudna
consulted his advisory council, consisting of faculty chairpersons and student senate representatives, about
the Moratorium and the school’s possible responses.  They could cancel all classes, a few classes, or simply
ignore it.  Exhibiting faith in the students’ peaceful intentions, the former President supported the
Moratorium so much that he agreed to the cancellation provided a proper program was devised.  The day’s
activities, Doudna insisted, had to provide calm, controlled educational sessions, and must not be merely an
outlet for student discontent and agitation.  The canceled class day would be made up at the semester’s end
by deferring final exams one day.[20]  Doudna’s advisory council, echoing student fears, questioned whether
students would take the day seriously, or simply perceive it as a vacation.  It was the radical faculty, after all,
that instigated the Moratorium, while the students had circulated no petitions and had not yet mustered a
single public demonstration.  Doudna eventually compromised.  He canceled only 9 a.m. classes to encourage
student attendance at the Vietnam Memorial Service, but supported any teacher’s desire to use class time to
discuss the day’s activities. His campus community memorandum stated that traditional rules and regulations
regarding class absences would be followed, meaning if a student missed class they would be penalized at the
teacher’s discretion.  The faculty, however, did not receive such leeway.  Doudna explicitly stated that
“faculty members have the same obligation to hold their classes as students have to attend them, except that
their obligation is contractual,” implying that expectations for faculty to behave accordingly were higher.[21] 
Doudna, by expressly following and citing standing university rules and regulations, and by remaining as
neutral as possible about his opinions towards the Vietnam War, adopted a “don’t give them (the community)
a reason to rebel” approach.  Any future violence, then, would have been unprovoked and unjustified, and
would make the administration appear as the victim, rather than the culprit.
The advisory council’s recommendations proved prophetic.  Their concerns about student sincerity
were justified by the extremely low student turnout at the Eastern Veteran Association-sponsored Memorial
Service.  Student Clyde Fazenbaker attributed this disappointing attendance to EIU's students “who don’t
give a damn, or wear a False Façade” that is, articulate concerns about the welfare of U.S. soldiers in
Vietnam, yet fail to actually act on those emotions and beliefs.[22] 
Accused of lacking conviction during the Moratorium, the 4 May 1970 Kent State shootings offered
EIU students an opportunity to express their unity and dispel any doubts of sincerity.  The prospect of being
killed simply for protesting, for exercising first amendment rights to assemble, invaded and haunted the
student body’s conscious. The previously parochial EIU community felt, closer than ever, the shockwaves of
the previously distant Vietnam conflict.  No longer was campus violence confined to major research
institutions such as Columbia University or Michigan State, but instead became a frightening possibility
everywhere.  Responding simultaneously to the U.S. invasion of Cambodia and the Kent State shootings,
nearly 250 EIU students, the largest EIU peace gathering thus far, assembled at the university flagpole where
Doudna had lowered the flag to half-staff that day only to honor all those hurt or killed due to campus
violence.  Students, however, wanted the flag lowered for the duration of the Vietnam War, insisting that
college-aged U.S. citizen-soldiers were dying daily.  Doudna, attempting to de-escalate the situation, wisely
employed only a handful of police officers to disperse the protestors.  EIU students never before, and never
again, would come that close to violence. 
Even though EIU did not respond violently, The Kent State shootings did mark an important turning
point in campus antiwar activity.  The students, not the faculty, took the torch of protestation and organized
antiwar demonstrations in the wake of the Kent State incident.  The reasoning for this shift is logical--
students had been killed for protesting the Vietnam War.  Other students, therefore, were both sympathetic
towards the victims and fearful that such actions could occur.  Additionally, students blamed the Vietnam War
for the catastrophe, reasoning that if the U.S. was not involved in the foreign dispute, the killings would not
have occurred.  To other students, Kent State victims became martyrs symbolizing the tragedies that the
Vietnam War wrought on American civilians as well as soldiers.  Such sentiment resulted in a series of
student-led events including a candlelight procession memorializing the victims and student editorials
condemning the National Guardsmen who fired upon students.  The Student Senate, reacting to the
“atrocious” events at Kent State, issued a statement that “this country is quickly evolving into an oppressive,
military state, aided and condoned by the President of the United States,” and actually called for a two-day
student strike.[23]  Student Geoffrey Pounds, in a rare display of discontent, was arrested and convicted of
flag desecration by covering the stars of the American flag with a swastika and writing “Kent State” across
the stripes, which he then proceeded to hang from his dorm window.[24]
Nevertheless, violence never occurred; Doudna’s actions, community pressure, and students alike
prevented its possibility.  To ensure the administration reacted accordingly, the Mt. Vernon Chamber of
Commerce circulated a petition on 26 May 1970 signed by 4470 citizens denouncing the “communistic
tactics” employed by EIU students regarding flag desecration, and stated that each student’s right to learn
should not be infringed by such un-American zealots.[25]  The Rich Township Republican Organization
similarly felt that it was every students’ right to attend class as well as not attend, and the university should
not contribute to “intellectual radicalism” by suggesting that protesting is more important than
education.[26]  For the students, the charge of a “false façade,” remained.  Some students sarcastically
referred to the protestors as “children of the apocalypse,” and were convinced that the flagpole protestors
gathered only because they were “looking for something to do on a nice Tuesday afternoon.”[27] Hencken
supports this belief by pointing out that the protestors represented a numerical minority; of the 4000 total
students, there were only 200-300 protestors that gathered at the flagpole.[28]  These divisions prevented
widespread demonstrations across campus, and made it easy for Doudna to contain potential violence.
Besides student divisions over sincerity, other issues, just as much as Vietnam, galvanized the interest
of students, such as drug problems and “student power,” which diverted attention away from Vietnam. 
Hencken concedes that the clash between EIU’s strongly traditional (i.e. old-fashioned) atmosphere and the
introduction of a liberal arts curriculum contributed to the passionate student rights movement, agreeing with
David Burner’s analysis of Columbia University’s violent tendencies.  Both Columbia’s and EIU’s science
and math-centered curriculum clashed heavily with the more liberal ideas of the student rights movement
noted above, mostly regarding civil rights and feminism.  This liberal arts curriculum encouraged
self-expression (either through art or music) and launched discussions revolving around sociology and human
behavior, which inevitably led to the questions of racism and equality.  Combined with the increased study of
history and government, students realized that questioning the government was a historical right.  Reacting to
the anti-authority sentiment unintentionally produced by the liberal arts curriculum, the students became
estranged from the faculty, and everything for which the faculty stood, including Vietnam’s importance. 
Consequently, students gradually moved away from the faculty’s prime issue, Vietnam, and decided to attack
issues directly affecting student rights.
Hencken, for example, recalls “hash Wednesday,”[29] where all the students would gather at the
library triangular area at high noon and openly and defiantly smoke marijuana.[30]  Similarly distracting, the
“student power” movement, referring to increased student rights, mostly regarding dorm rules and
regulations, began to take hold.  This national movement stemmed from domestic problems including
environmentalism, civil rights, poverty, and feminism.  Women’s rights, for example, were a major conflict
source as EIU females fought passionately to extend curfew hours beyond 10 P.M., and succeeded.  
EIU’s community perceived Vietnam as a distant problem, as evidenced by its lack of coverage in the
Eastern News, an omission that may have acted as a calming effect that downplayed fears and tempers.  The
student body collectively reacted only when its own security was threatened, such as when draft expansion
occurred, or when innocent students began being killed, like at Kent State.  This pattern was similar to many
universities, however, as there were few instances of campus violence that rivaled those at Columbia,
Southern Illinois University, or Kent State.  The most dangerous assumption regarding the 1960s is to view
all universities as hotbeds of dissent and revolution.  In fact, most colleges and universities mirrored Eastern;
their anti-Vietnam protests were nonviolent and comparatively smaller than those highly publicized
demonstrations at Columbia, Kent State, and the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.  EIU’s
parochial community, strategic administrative decisions, and divisions within and between the faculty and
student sectors all contributed to deflating a potentially violent situation.
Admittedly, much remains to be discovered about the motives and nature of the anti-Vietnam campus
violence at smaller, regional universities.  A study that would compare EIU’s responses and actions to those
at similar institutions would allow for superior generalizations about why such violence that shook the nation
and rattled our resolve did not occur at most universities.  Conversely, comparing smaller schools like EIU to
larger research institutions might help explain leading factors that created such aggressive situations at certain
schools, but only miniscule skirmishes at others.  One thing is certain: if EIU was representative of most
non-research oriented institutions, one can safely generalize that anti-Vietnam activity existed at nearly all
higher learning institutions, and that, comparatively, the peaceful nature of those activities at Eastern Illinois
University was not unique.
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